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The tenth anniversary of entry into force of the CWC marks a success
story of a treaty wich it is at the same time an instrument of disarma-
ment and of non-proliferation. At present, the entry into force of the
CWC marks the success of a treaty which is at one and the CWC
remains a unique endeavour, encompassing all the main features of dis-
armament treaties: it is non-discriminatory; universal, in that almost all
States of the international community are party to it, and verifiable, the
obligations entered into by States Parties are subject to strict control.
The CWC is thus a step forward with respect to the BWC and the NPT,
treaties which do not contain all three of these main features of mod-
ern disarmament conventions. Moreover, integrity constitutes another
important feature, since reservations are not admitted.
The importance of the CWC should be appreciated in terms of its con-
tribution to the disarmament process and the development of law in
this field. Nowadays the importance of disarmament seems to be declin-
ing in the perception of major powers. Nevertheless, the CWC remains
a stable achievement that will not be annulled by the current slow-
down. No State has withdrawn from the CWC to date. However, the
status of the Convention in wartime has not yet been clarified.
Nevertheless, the obligation not to use chemical weapons against any-
one now belongs to customary international law and more recent instru-
ments, such as the statute of the International Criminal Court, have
qualified the use of chemical weapons as an international crime. They
are banned both in time of international armed conflict and during a
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civil war. Therefore the importance of the Convention should also be
appreciated in terms of the development of international law.
The organization set up to administer the CWC – the OPCW – is
another important element. The gathering together of States in the
Executive Council and the Conference of States Parties ensures a per-
manent dialogue between review conferences, which are held at regular
intervals but usually every five years. However, the Technical Secretariat
is endowed with specific functions and real powers, for instance in the
framework of challenge inspections.
While the CWC can widely be seen as a success, it has encountered a
number of problems and issues during the past ten years that still have
to be solved.
First and foremost, the process of destroying chemical stockpiles is pro-
ceeding at a very slow pace. There are significant delays in the destruc-
tion of chemical arsenals in all countries, but it is still possible to stay
within the terms of the Treaty by requesting a postponement. The delay
is only partially due to technical challenges; the vanishing political sup-
port from some major States Parties and the lack of resources also play
a very important role. The costs connected with this process are quite
high and have probably been underestimated, and the lack of funding,
whether alleged or real, slows the pace, thus further increasing the costs;
clearly, there is a strong need for significant additional political and eco-
nomic commitment.
Political support cannot be taken for granted, as countries do not always
feel at ease with some of the Convention’s implementing measures .
While the intrusiveness of the challenge inspection mechanism is essen-
tial for the actual implementation of the CWC, it can also backfire,
causing a generalised political disaffection for the whole process.
Therefore, a difficult balancing between these two conflicting needs
must be found.
Other issues also need to be clarified, such as the legality of non-lethal
weapons and their status under the CWC.
The CWC experience remains a bright but lonely star in the not-so-very
populated firmament of international agreements controlling the worri-
some phenomenon of weapons of mass destruction.
The CWC success story should be used to the fullest as a paradigm of
reference for arms control and disarmament in other fields, such as
nuclear and biological weapons.
Preface
This publication contains the main papers presented at the conference
on The Tenth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
Assessment and Perspectives, held in Rome under the auspices of the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference was introduced by
Vittorio Michele Craxi, Undersecretary of State, Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and by Umberto Ranieri, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, Italian Chamber of Deputies. Guido Pollice,
President, Green Cross Italia, Rome; Rogelio Pfirter, Ambassador,
Director-General, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons-OPCW, The Hague; and Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto
Affari Internazionali, Rome, also addressed the conference. The  confer-
ence’s agenda can be found at the end. The summary of the proceedings
illustrates the lively discussion after each session. The papers collected
belongs to authors coming from different schools and the views
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Istituto Affari
Internazionali. The editors are confident that the Rome Conference will
be a useful contribution to next year’s CWC Review Conference.
G.G. / N.R.
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Sergey Batsanov*
1. THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES
Introduction  
History often surprises us with coincidences. In this case, the end of 2006
marked the beginning of a series of anniversaries of various multilateral and
bilateral treaties completely or partially dealing with security, non-prolifer-
ation and disarmament. Last September we celebrated the 10th anniver-
sary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) (one may ask, how much is there to celebrate?); this year we have
the 40th anniversaries of both the opening for signature and the entry into
force of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; this summer there will be the 35th
anniversary of the first agreement between the two major nuclear weapons
states on the limitation of their strategic arsenals (SALT 1) and of the late
Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limiting the missile defence systems in
the two countries. Next year we will have celebrations for the 40th anniver-
sary of the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All
of those treaties and agreements have contributed to international securi-
ty and helped avoid some of the worst manifestations of the arms race.
However, on balance the record is rather mixed.
One anniversary, however, gives much more reason for celebration than
for concern (although there are some), and that is the anniversary of the
9
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Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On 29 April 2007, the inter-
national community will salute the 10th anniversary of its entry into
force and the establishment of its implementing organisation, the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based
on the CWC. Despite all the problems of the initial period, and the dif-
ficulties that transpired later on the road to implementation, the CWC
and the OPCW appear to be, so far, the most successful undertaking in
the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, capable of withstanding
the pressures of time and of global change. It is also solid proof that
effective multilateralism is not only possible, but can be highly success-
ful. Just a few examples – more detailed analysis will follow in the sec-
tions below.
CWC is the fastest growing regime ever, including 182 states parties just
10 years after its entry into force. No other regime can boast such an
achievement. Only 13 states remain outside the regime, of which 6 are
signatories and, hence, under obligation – in accordance with interna-
tional law – not to take actions contrary to the Convention, such as to
produce, develop, test, proliferate or use chemical weapons. Thus, an
international legal norm against chemical weapons has already become
a solid element of customary international law.
The CWC/OPCW succeeded in launching, under severe time pressure,
a most extensive and elaborate regime of verification and inspections,
making an inventory of almost all CW stockpiles in the world, ensuring
that the stocks are reasonably well secured and are gradually being elim-
inated – although not as fast as originally envisaged. To call a spade a
spade, the dream of destroying all chemical weapons in 10 years did not
materialise. But, at the same time, in combination with the cessation of
production of CW, verified destruction or conversion of production
facilities and consequential phasing out of qualified military and pro-
duction cadres, as well as of CW capable means of delivery has already
resulted in a serious decrease in the military value of remaining stocks,
as well as of the perceived utility of traditional CW in general. Thus,
confidence in the regime and among States Parties has grown signifi-
cantly, and the risk of CW proliferation has by and large diminished.
Another notable success of the regime was the establishment, in a num-
ber of States Parties, of national implementation mechanisms, the adop-
tion of laws and regulations to implement the treaty, setting the stage
for close cooperation among States in various areas, involving govern-
ment officials, military, parliamentarians, lawyers, scientists, the private
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sector and NGOs. As a result, strong pro-CWC communities have come
to life in a number of countries, contributing immensely to transparen-
cy and confidence building and to the stability of the regime in general.
And, finally, the success of the CWC and the OPCW has provided
humankind with an inspiring example of how it is possible not only to
outlaw one particular category of weapon of mass destruction, but grad-
ually to move towards its complete elimination. It is appropriate  to
remember this, also because there  are  signs of the revitalisation of the
Conference on Disarmament – the mother of almost all multilateral
treaties on arms control and non-proliferation – and a renewed hope
that the conference will again become a busy working body, as at the
time of the CWC and the CTBT negotiations.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the 10th anniversary of the OPCW
is being celebrated throughout the world. There have been meetings in
Europe, the United States, Latin America, with more to come. They are
not just mere celebrations, but also, and perhaps, more importantly,
political will builders because, all the very deserved praise notwith-
standing, much remains to be done, and the treaty, together with the
OPCW, has to be nurtured by its owners – Member States – in a care-
ful and forward looking way.
Italy played a very important and difficult role at the crucial stage of
negotiations in Geneva, being the coordinator of the not so easy to man-
age Western Group. It was one of the first to ratify the CWC and to
adopt national implementing legislation, and then amended it in line
with the requirements of the Convention. Italy displayed much trans-
parency and good will in opening up its chemical industry for verifica-
tion, being ready to go further than many other countries. It contributed
substantially to building the OPCW and keeping it up to date, includ-
ing through a series of inspector training courses at its facilities. The
most recent course took place in March 2007 in Civitavecchia for newly
recruited OPCW inspectors. Last, but not least, Italy has shown good
will in assisting other States Parties, in particular the Russian Federation,
with the elimination of their chemical weapons arsenals.
1. OPCW  -  Reasons for Success
Several important ingredients account for the success of the Chemical
Weapons Conventions and the OPCW.
The CWC is, probably, the most “democratic” disarmament regime. It is
Sergey Batsanov
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“non-discriminatory” in that it treats all member states equally, regard-
less of whether or not they possess chemical weapons, and it  explicitly
combines disarmament and non-proliferation functions. By contrast, the
NPT, concluded in 1968, created two categories of states – “nuclear
weapons states” and “non-nuclear weapons states”. This  distinction  was
further reinforced in 1995 by the indefinite extension of the NPT (orig-
inally concluded for a period of 25 years) to deal with the new posses-
sors of nuclear weapons, such as India and Pakistan. In addition, the
CWC is different from its predecessor treaties, as well as from the later
CTBT in that it does not give special rights to any individual parties,
including the conditions for entry into force or the permanent seats on
the executive body. Of course, more powerful nations have a greater say,
but this is not legally guaranteed them.
The CWC is the only treaty with a “matching” implementation and ver-
ification mechanism – the OPCW – which is responsible, at least in the-
ory, for all aspects of compliance with and implementation of the CWC.
The CWC regime is “reasonably” verifiable. OPCW on-site inspection
procedures monitor the elimination of all inventories of chemical
weapons and former CW production facilities, and include routine
inspections of a large number of commercial chemical facilities. The
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons
(BWC), in contrast, lacks any formal mechanisms for implementation or
compliance and has only embryonic verification measures, subject to a
decision by the UN Security Council. The CWC’s inspection activities
are also far more intensive and diversified than those conducted by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose verification man-
date covers, as noted above, only safeguards and no other aspects of
NPT compliance. This last point is of particular importance since it
makes the CWC “a living organism”, and gives it a variety of tools to
adjust to new geopolitical realities and to deal with inevitable  imple-
mentation problems.
Many, if not all, the basic provisions of the CWC are built – sometimes
implicitly, often explicitly – around the idea of cooperation among parties.
This message is clearly visible in verification and compliance provisions
and, as the first decade of implementation shows so well, has been applied
by States Parties to a range of other activities, from national implementa-
tion to the destruction of chemical weapons, even though the latter is
defined by the CWC as the responsibility of respective possessor States.
The provisions of the Convention, detailed as they are, give significant
powers to the Executive Council and to the Conference of States Parties
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– the main organs of the OPCW with regard to specific implementation
situations. That, in turn, involves a number of States Parties in the deci-
sion-making process on a regular basis, and thus reinforces their atten-
tion to the CWC and their political will to make it work.
These features have definitely helped the CWC and the OPCW to
manage better in a turbulent period of transition from a bipolar world
to a new, yet to be defined system of international relations, which at
present can be characterised as a complicated mix of unipolarity  and
multipolarity.
2. CWC and the Changing Global Environment
The CWC and the OPCW were products of the final phase of the Cold
War and could not have emerged in a different historic environment,
whether several years earlier or later. Since then, the global political
environment has undergone rapid and profound changes which are
illustrated, inter alia, by the fact that the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, negotiated  in the mid-1990s, can still not be brought into force
10 years after being opened for signature because of the crisis of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime, the collapse of negotiations on the
BWC verification protocol and the decade of continued hibernation of
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
The current phase in international relations is a transitional one, with
the intensive processes of geopolitical reconfiguration, emergence of
new centres of power and the consequential crisis of traditional interna-
tional institutions and the erosion, or, perhaps, evolution of norms of
international law. Globalisation, and more specifically, gradual redistrib-
ution of the powers of nation-states in favour of super-state and sub-
state (or non-state) actors adds to  an increased sense of  insecurity, as
does the emergence of new threats, including that of terrorism.
As a result, more and more States, large and small, are manoeuvring to
secure or improve their geopolitical situation, obtain or preserve access
to vital natural resources and look for better protection against external
influences or pressures. Regrettably, despite the mounting evidence that
military power cannot solve today’s problems, the complexity and the
unpredictability of the present world pushes many political leaders in
the direction of military build-up and often makes them reluctant to
consider limitations on existing and potential military programmes.
Among the many victims of these dangerous political tendencies are
Sergey Batsanov
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arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as multilater-
alism in general.
The CWC has been lucky to have been affected less than other regimes,
but it is not immune to these challenges, and many specific problems of
chemical disarmament, such as insufficient funding for CW destruction
resulting in a slower than expected pace of chemical disarmament, can
be explained to some extent by a lack of political will or attention stem-
ming from the general malaise in the area of disarmament (see the sec-
tion on CW destruction).
There are no treaty-specific remedies for this category of challenges, at
least in the direct sense. Two points should be made, however. The first
is that the CWC/OPCW remains a bright spot on the otherwise grim
map of multilateral disarmament, and that the problems of chemical
disarmament have not so far become insurmountable; the only require-
ment is to identify them in time and deal with them in an open, coop-
erative manner, without losing sight of the fact that much more than
narrow technical issues are at stake. The second is that the synergy
between the Convention and the OPCW is in itself a powerful antidote
to the general deterioration of the state of affairs in disarmament, since
the organisation, which brings together States Parties and the secretari-
at, is capable of  generating new ideas and collective political will.
3. Adjusting to New Realities 
The specific circumstances, concerns and perceptions that made it pos-
sible for the CWC to be born and start functioning more or less success-
fully, also imposed certain limitations on the organisation and its opera-
tions. It was simply not feasible at the time of the CWC negotiations to
anticipate certain aspects of today’s world to which the OPCW must
now respond. One example is the treaty’s excessive emphasis on the
verification of CW destruction at the expense of certain types of indus-
try inspections, the explanation being the extreme mutual mistrust
between the two superpowers  and the lack of reliable information
about the respective stockpiles which prevailed in the 1980s. Other
examples of the changed circumstances include a noticeable evolution
of the perception and prioritisation of major threats. Although the
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has not gone
away, its perceived importance has diminished relative to other threats,
such as the spread of communicable diseases. The perception of the
The Tenth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention
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nature of the chemical threat is also different today: it is no longer seen
as coming from the superpowers’ arsenals but from those of terrorists or
a small number of states that refuse to join the CWC. But, it may well
be argued that this perception is also largely a result of the CWC.
Equally, the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention regarding
assistance and protection against the use of chemical weapons, earlier per-
ceived as a means of assuring non-chemical weapons States against possi-
ble attack by CW possessors, may be losing some of their relevance with
the dramatic growth of the number of CWC States Parties and the grad-
ual reduction of existing arsenals; yet other threats, including those of
chemical terrorism and chemical calamities, are growing. At the same
time, the chemical industry and science have been undergoing important
changes, including the introduction of new technologies, equipment and
processes, as well as new business and organisational approaches. Trade in
chemicals has also grown considerably and new chemical compounds and
mixtures, some of them of potential relevance to the CWC, have become
available, both for industrial and counter-terrorism  purposes. Finally,
especially during the last several  years, there has been a real revolution in
the means of protection against and detection of chemical agents.
It is also noteworthy that, while it was considered more effective in the
past to treat different types of WMD separately from one another, in
today’s world many of those issues have become much more interrelat-
ed and interdependent. While the technical differences remain strong,
political problems of WMD proliferation often overlap; and the new
risks, such as terrorism with WMD cannot be handled by any State or
even intergovernmental organisation single-handedly.
Finally, the over-all success story of the CWC has brought to light a cer-
tain number of miscalculations or imbalances built into the treaty due
to insufficient information available during negotiations or simply the
intention to paper over difficult issues that had been delaying the con-
clusion of the treaty. Today, some of the problems that were “put aside”,
are coming to the surface and need to be addressed by the organisation,
which has in the meantime proven its problem-solving capability.
More importantly, the new realities, together with the progress in CWC
implementation, underline the need to identify the new security inter-
ests of States Parties that the CWC and the OPCW should be able to
address. In other words, now is the time to start asking what there is in
the Convention to guarantee its attractiveness to States Parties in future,
and how the OPCW should  look in a chemical weapons-free world.
Sergey Batsanov
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4. Implementation Problems 
The most immediate challenges to the well-being of the Convention
and to the future of chemical disarmament in general are related to
the slow or, otherwise, insufficient  progress in the achievement of
what the vast majority, if not all the States Parties still  believe to be
the priority implementation tasks of the CWC. These include the
destruction of chemical weapons, achievement of universal participa-
tion in the Convention and its proper implementation on the nation-
al and international  levels. There are some lingering, but not acute
concerns about compliance with the CWC by some of the States
Parties, occasional complaints about what some nations believe to be
less than satisfactory implementation of certain articles, such as
Article VI (Activities not Prohibited by the Convention) and Article
XI (Economic and Technological Development), differences in inter-
pretation of certain provisions, as well as some not so serious house-
keeping difficulties that are normally found, in one form or another, in
any international institution.
5. CW Destruction
Both the achievements and difficulties in this area are becoming
increasingly evident, especially in the light of the fact that most of the
CW possessor States will not be able to comply with the 10-year dead-
line established in the Convention for the final destruction of their
stockpiles. The CWC deadlines have turned out to be unrealistic, and
procedures for their modification too rigid. Of course, the main difficul-
ties have emerged with chemical warfare agents, and not with muni-
tions. On the other hand, the world has witnessed new and very posi-
tive examples of international cooperation in the area of destruction,
not envisaged in the Convention. Although the treaty states clearly that
the costs of destroying CW and of related verification  must be borne
by the possessor States, in fact more than one of them has asked for and
received financial or technical assistance with CW destruction (in the
case of Albania, with meeting verification costs as well).
At the beginning, it seemed that Russia would be the only possessor
State having difficulties with the timely destruction of its chemical arse-
nals – Russia’s problems became obvious even before negotiations on
the CWC were concluded when, at Moscow’s request, the already
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agreed treaty provision requiring complete destruction of CW stocks in
ten years was reopened and renegotiated in 1992 so as to allow for a 5-
year extension of the final deadline.
For most of the first decade after the entry into force, the delays with CW
destruction in Russia caused by insufficient funding were, perhaps, the only
disquieting signal of what could happen when the destruction deadline
approached. But once the financing of the Russian destruction program
picked up, both through national funding and international assistance,
things started to improve. The destruction rate is now rapidly increasing.
While it took Russia nine years to destroy the first ten percent of its stock-
pile of 40,000 tons of agent, the second ten per cent was done in just a bit
over half a year – between August 2006 and April 2007. As of mid-April
2007, Russia has surpassed an important 20 percent benchmark.
The opposite tendency has manifested itself in the US – the second
largest possessor of chemical weapons. The US had started destruction
before the CWC entered into force, and until recently was running
ahead of the CWC schedule, having surpassed the figure of 40 percent
by mid-April 2007. Nevertheless, this initial success created a sense of
complacency and, together with the general atmosphere of indiffer-
ence towards disarmament, has led to a situation in which military and
technical experts have been left alone to deal with constantly emerg-
ing problems, often of a political nature, without the proper oversight.
As a result, the construction of several destruction facilities has suf-
fered long delays. In April 2006, the United States not only requested
the maximum extension of five years, but announced that it might fail
to complete destruction even by the 2012 deadline. Moreover, accord-
ing to some reports, it may take the US as long as 11 more years – until
2023 – to complete destruction.1
Against this background, the difficulties of lesser magnitude experi-
enced by other possessor States with smaller arsenals cannot significant-
ly affect the general situation. The fact remains, however, that the CWC
negotiators seriously underestimated the technological complexity,
huge financial burden and various other issues evolving by their own
logic (environmental regulations, local concerns and politics, etc), asso-
ciated with CW destruction.
The XI Conference of States Parties, the highest policy-making body of the
OPCW, which met on 5-8 December 2006, adopted several decisions
1 Global Security Newswire, 22 November 2006
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extending the final destruction deadlines for five of the six possessor
States.2 The United States and the Russian Federation were given the
maximum extension possible under the CWC – until 29 April 2012. Libya
(which joined the convention at a very late stage) was given until the end
of 2010 to complete its destructions program, while India was granted a
reprieve till the end of April 2009. The fifth possessor state, which prefers
not to be named publicly, will have to destroy its last weapons by the end
of 2008. Only Albania, which was also late in starting its destruction,
declared its intention to do the job by April 2007, although it asked for and
received extensions of the intermediate deadlines.
Under the circumstances it would be premature to discuss now what
would happen if one or more CW possessor States failed to meet the April
2012 deadline, but in reality this debate has already begun. Some experts
contend that an amendment to the CWC (and hence the convening of a
formal Amendment Conference) will be necessary. Others believe that this
approach would be disruptive, as it could open the treaty to attempts to
renegotiate other important  provisions, and hence hope to resolve such a
fundamental issue through some sort of “technical amendment”.
Another, more elegant approach would be to make use of a series of
provisions of the CWC, regarding consultation, cooperation and fact-
finding, as well as measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance
(Article IX, paragraphs 1-7, and Article XII). The authors of the
Convention have deliberately put emphasis on the need for the
Executive Council and the Conference of States Parties to decide first
on measures needed to remedy, within a specified time, a situation that
contravenes the provisions of the Convention, while avoiding hasty rul-
ings on compliance and punitive actions.
In fact, such an approach already received political support from States
Parties when Albania, the smallest CWC possessor State, which has not
asked for the extension of the 10-year deadline within the timeframe
envisaged by the CWC, suddenly faced technical difficulties with destruc-
tion in early 2007. While there is no legal possibility for Albania to be
granted an extension, consideration of the issue by the Executive Council
and an eventual decision based on the merits of the issue and aimed at
facilitating the speedy reversal of the situation, appears to be the most
promising and constructive option. This example shows that a politically
and legally workable solution, short of amending the treaty (even in the
2 OPCW Press Release, 11 December 2006
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form of a technical change), can be found. It also demonstrates that the
main objective should be to promote the destruction process in every pos-
sible way, rather than to argue about minor details. In this sense, the so-
called Albanian case might turn out to be useful for future situations as
well. That said, the worst case scenarios for 2012 can only be speculative
at this point, and efforts should be concentrated on ensuring compliance
with the new deadlines just approved by the OPCW.
It is therefore of the utmost importance to ensure that the CW posses-
sors, and in particular the two biggest ones, display the necessary politi-
cal will and high-level attention to this problem, needed to ensure ade-
quate funding, effective inter-agency coordination and a search for imag-
inative solutions to remaining technological and local political issues.
From the technical point of view, it might be attractive to concentrate
efforts on  degrading the CW agents, rendering them militarily useless
and economically unattractive for reconversion into CW agents (chem-
ically that would always be possible, but at a great cost, and with
unproven technologies). The contentious issue of determining the end-
point of chemical weapons destruction would come into play here.
Greater flexibility on this and other technical issues might make it pos-
sible to accept the completion of destruction at an earlier stage and thus
meet the extended deadlines. After all, according to the CWC, the
destruction is understood to be a process by which chemicals are con-
verted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for the pro-
duction of chemical weapons. If any toxic waste were to remain at the
expiry of the final deadline in 2012, it would be much easier to deal
with it both from the political and legal points of view.
Finally, it appears necessary to proceed with the development of a new
vision of the OPCW in a chemical weapons-free world – not only
because such a vision is needed to address new challenges, but also
because it would help build both the conviction that chemical weapons
will soon disappear from the earth and the political will required to
make that happen.
6. Universality  and  National  Implementation  
To make a chemical weapons-free world a reality, one very important
condition must be met: the achievement of universal participation in the
CWC. Universality is both one of the OPCW’s success stories and a chal-
lenge. Much has been done in this direction; so far the  CWC has been
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the fastest growing global disarmament treaty, as far as its membership is
concerned. With 182 States Parties, the CWC encompasses over 90 per-
cent of the world’s population. The comprehensive, non-discriminatory
nature of the CWC has played a positive role in promoting its interna-
tional acceptance. Another significant factor has been the mutually rein-
forcing relationship between the CWC and the OPCW.The organisation
has played an important role in supporting the treaty by convincing non-
Parties to join and applying pressure on States that are already parties to
behave better than they otherwise would have. Other global WMD
treaties do not enjoy comparable institutional support.
In a departure from the experience of “older” multilateral arms control
treaties, and having overcome the initial criticism for that, the OPCW
has played a highly proactive role in persuading new States to join and
helping them to develop domestic implementing legislation and regula-
tions, while taking their specific political, legal, and economic conditions
into account. These achievements  have been the result of long-term
planning, analysis, non-traditional diplomacy (including coalition-build-
ing), effective adaptation to changing circumstances, and continuity of
effort – a combination that individual states with their diverse foreign
policy priorities usually cannot sustain. It goes without saying that tak-
ing on this role, previously reserved for governments, the OPCW has
had to act skilfully and with at least the tacit support of important
member states – something which cannot always be taken for granted
and, on occasion, has to be convincingly engineered.
In the course of this work, the OPCW has also overcome the conven-
tional wisdom that a State’s decision to join a security-related treaty is
strictly an internal, sovereign matter. Instead, the OPCW has worked
proactively to influence internal governmental decision-making.
Specific achievements in this area include the decisions to join the
CWC by Sudan, Serbia and Montenegro, Afghanistan, Libya, and sever-
al of the former Soviet republics, particularly in Central Asia.
Today only two geographic areas remain of serious concern with respect
to the universality and non-proliferation value of the CWC, namely
North Korea and a few countries in the Middle East, in particular, Syria,
Egypt, Lebanon and Israel (the latter signed the CWC, but is showing
little willingness to ratify it). Given the difficulty of these hold-out
cases, however, creative political strategies and strong support by major
world powers will be necessary to gain their adherence.
Having many countries is important, but clearly insufficient if some are
not implementing the treaty’s complicated requirements. Moreover, a
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well-organised and transparent system  of  national implementation
strongly reinforces the CWC compliance mechanism and provides an
additional level of assurance to other Parties regarding the compliance
of the country in question. In fact, the above observations are not only
applicable to the chemical weapons ban but also to other weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), counter-terrorism, environmental protection,
human rights, and post-conflict reconstruction.
The OPCW has pioneered in providing assistance with national imple-
mentation to Member States, including the preparation and adoption of
domestic legislation and administrative regulations and setting up func-
tional national authorities. Once again, an old assumption had to be
tactfully overcome, namely that law-making is strictly the internal busi-
ness of individual States.
Despite serious progress, CWC national implementation still leaves
much to be desired. This can be attributed in part to the complexity of
the subject and the slow work pace of many parliaments. It would be
useful to work more closely with international organisations that help
with the national implementation of other relevant regimes or arrange-
ments, such as the IAEA, and regional bodies, like the African Union. A
very useful initiative, both in terms of universality and national imple-
mentation, was the adoption by the European Council in December
2005 of the Joint Action on support for OPCW activities in the frame-
work of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
7. Verification  and Compliance
On balance, the system of routine on-site inspections of treaty-relevant
military and commercial facilities has worked quite well. By the end of
2006, the OPCW had conducted more than 2500 inspections at almost
1000 sites in over 70 countries. Over time, imbalances in the design of
the verification regime have come to light, such as the extremely heavy
emphasis on the verification of CW destruction (85 percent of all
inspector-days) at the expense of certain types of industry inspections.
These imbalances have resulted in some cases from lingering Cold War
assumptions and in other cases from the absence, at the time of negoti-
ations, of correct information about relevant facilities. For example, it
turned out that most of the declared Schedule 1 facilities were, in fact,
small laboratories that did not warrant the heavy verification regime
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prescribed by the CWC. Conversely, a large number of industrial plant
sites producing discrete organic chemicals (DOCs) remain practically
untouched by routine visits. OPCW is taking steps to address these
imbalances, such as efforts to reduce the number of inspectors at CW
destruction facilities in the United States, Russia, and – to a lesser extent
– India. As noted above, the current level of confidence, coupled with
the experience accumulated during numerous CW inspections over
almost ten years, have eased security concerns about chemical weapons
already declared and slated for destruction. This, in turn, reduces the
need to spend the  lion’s share of OPCW inspector resources on the ver-
ification of CW destruction.
But whether this should automatically lead to increased intensity of
industry verification is a totally different question. This question must
be addressed not in isolation but rather in the context of the rapid man-
agerial, organisational, and technological changes taking place in the
chemical industry today. Mobility and flexibility in production tech-
niques, nanotechnology and micro-reactors, the shrinking size of pro-
duction and business units, new capabilities to produce an ever-wider
range of toxic chemicals and blurred boundaries between chemistry and
biology – all of these developments will undoubtedly affect the future
of industry inspections
There is probably not much that needs to be done to improve the effec-
tiveness of verification at Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities. The
intensity of such inspections has been adequate; moreover, given the
actual global inventory of Schedule 1 facilities, which turned out to be
less dangerous than it was assumed during negotiations, the OPCW
decision in favour of a modest reduction of inspections there was quite
appropriate. Equally appropriate was the introduction, in 2006, of on-
site sampling and analysis at Schedule 2 facilities – an important proce-
dure which had been envisaged by the CWC but not initially applied
for several reasons.
The opposite picture has emerged with regard to inspections at plant
sites producing discrete organic chemicals, alias Other Chemical
Production Facilities (OCPF).While the chemicals themselves are of lit-
tle danger to the Convention, the plant sites are normally huge, often
multi-functional, especially with modern technology packed with easi-
ly re-adjustable equipment. States Parties are required by the CWC to
provide very limited information about these sites; moreover, they often
have difficulties themselves in identifying such sites on their own terri-
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tory for the purposes of reporting to the OPCW. In 1998 (the first full
year after the entry into force) about 3300 such sites were identified; in
2006 this number increased to more than 5000, largely as a result of a
special assistance program to Member States run by the OPCW. In the
meantime the intensity of inspections at the OCPF sites was running
between 1 and 2.5 percent per year, thus offering no real deterrent value
and no accumulation of experience, and practically guaranteeing that
most of the sites would not be inspected for decades. The selection cri-
teria for inspections have not been adopted either, while several States
Parties still feel uncomfortable about even modest increases in the num-
ber of such inspections. Some of these problems also apply to Schedule
3 inspections, but a lesser degree. There is no magic formula to correct
the situation, but its continuation will keep undermining the credibility
of the CWC industry verification regime. It is clear, however, that a lot
of work needs to be done by the OPCW, its Member States and, last but
not least, the chemical industry in order to find the way forward.
Besides routine inspections, the CWC has created the most radical ver-
ification tool – the right available to any State Party to request a “chal-
lenge” inspection of any facility suspected of violating the treaty, with-
out right of refusal. Although this powerful instrument has not yet been
used, the OPCW Director-General and relevant parts of the OPCW
Technical Secretariat are preparing the inspectorate to mount a chal-
lenge inspection as soon as a request is received. There exists a body of
opinion that the absence of a challenge inspection to date is another sign
of weakness of the CWC verification system.
This view, however, does not take into account the fundamental differ-
ence between the challenge inspection and other means of verification
envisaged by the CWC. The former was designed as both a deterrent
and an ultimate guarantee for a state party having serious concerns
about compliance by another state, so that, even if it is not a member of
a powerful coalition, it still has a means at its disposal to have its con-
cerns addressed. On the other hand, the challenge inspection proce-
dures have been carefully calibrated to contain a complex mix of checks
and balances, and, indeed, represent a double-edged sword that must be
used very carefully to avoid major political embarrassment  for a
requesting Party. As a result, the absence of challenge inspection
requests rather demonstrates that no State Party has had such serious
suspicions as to compel it to resort to a challenge.
What is needed is an in-depth review of the preparations already
made by the OPCW, including various procedures, to ensure that they
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are workable and effective. One question arises in this regard: the
CWC time-lines for challenge inspections have a serious gap at the
beginning, in that they contain no indication of how soon after sub-
mission of the request to the Executive Council the inspection team
should depart for (or arrive at) the inspected State Party’s site. One
could also have a closer look at how the launch of a challenge inspec-
tion would affect the OPCW’s capabilities to act if another request
were to come soon after the first one. (Under the CWC, the Director-
General is under the obligation to report to the Executive Council if
at any given moment the available resources are not sufficient to
mount a challenge inspection).
Another aspect of compliance is the fact that the CWC verification
mechanism is spread rather unevenly among the various prohibitions
and obligations. Major elements of the treaty that have a direct impact
on its non-proliferation potential, such as the prohibitions on assisting
or encouraging other states to acquire chemical weapons, as well as on
transfer of such weapons, have largely been neglected. In theory, the
absence of specific verification provisions in the CWC for monitoring
these obligations does not preclude the OPCW from developing addi-
tional procedures to address the problem (similar to how the IAEA is
regularly enhancing and broadening the safeguards system ), but the
political will has been lacking. As a result, this lacuna in the CWC
regime is now being filled by ad hoc measures outside the treaty frame-
work, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
The OPCW should also have greater flexibility to make improve-
ments in the verification system consistent with the treaty, either
through targeted decision-making by the Conference of States Parties
or, in specific cases, through the budgetary process. For example,
CWC provisions designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical
weapons and related technologies, such as export controls, could  be
strengthened. To start with, one should return to the pending issue of
applying export controls to Schedule 3 chemicals (if not outright pro-
hibition, then at least reporting requirements). Some thought could
be given to developing non-obligatory guidelines on national measures
to implement the non-transfer and non-assistance obligations under
Article I  of the Convention. It would be of interest to know how
Parties are implementing these obligations, what legal basis exists for
it and whether any best practices can be identified. The possibility of
voluntary visits to facilities that play an important role in preventing
illegal shipments of weapons and technology, like major sea ports,
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could also be an option – perhaps, one or another Party could consid-
er hosting such a visit. Further down the road a need for a more for-
mal document could be examined.
8. Newly Emerging Risks and Challenges
In the new global situation, problems related to different types of WMD
and their proliferation have become much more interdependent.
Despite the specificity of the chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile
control regimes, new forms of combating the spread of WMD have
sought to address these various categories of weapons under the same
framework (again, PSI is a good example). This interrelation was not
envisaged when the CWC was being negotiated.
Also unexpected at the time of the CWC’s adoption was the growing
threat of terrorist use of WMD. Even when this risk became more obvi-
ous, many governments were reluctant to explore the potential of the
OPCW and similar organisations to combat WMD terrorism. Just as in
the area of non-proliferation, efforts to prevent the terrorist use of
WMD cannot be effective if governments continue to maintain firewalls
between the various types of WMD.
There is a dilemma here: on the one hand, the OPCW can hardly count
on maintaining its relevance and “market value” indefinitely if it stays
away from these new cross-boundary problems; on the other hand, it
cannot pretend to address such problems in their entirety. Hence, the
question before the CWC States Parties is about properly defining the
role and place of the new and very capable mechanism they have creat-
ed in the global effort to address these new problems and phenomena.
In the case of terrorism, it is  not enough to say that the OPCW’s role
is limited to destruction of chemical weapons so that the terrorists can-
not steal them (theft of chemical weapons for terrorist purposes is an
unlikely proposition – terrorists are much more likely to use the
destructive forces that are readily available, as shown by chlorine attacks
in Iraq). Nevertheless, the role of the organisation can only be limited.
Despite the fact that chemical terrorism is a threat, not to be ignored,
there are no terrorist organisations or groups which are specifically
“chemical”; and the OPCW should not have the task of fighting terror-
ism as a whole. But it has enough intellectual and material capacity to
contribute to defining the threat better, assessing the relative risks pre-
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sented by certain chemicals and processes in this context and serving as
a forum of consultation and cooperation among States Parties on a wide
range of chemical security issues, which have an important development
dimension and, thus, could be of interest to a majority of the CWC
Parties. There are no reasons why the OPCW should not look at
expanding international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry in
a way that does not create new proliferation risks, as well as at improv-
ing the safety of chemical industry against terrorist attacks and natural
disasters. The final document of the First Review Conference included
some rather modest remarks on the protection of chemical industry
facilities against terrorist attacks. Since then, the United States and
other Western countries have made efforts to improve the physical
security of their chemical plant sites. One should give serious thought
to how this experience can be shared to benefit the safe development
of the chemical industry in the developing world. In other words, how
can we find synergies between Article X (on protection against chemi-
cal weapons) and Article XI (on international cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of chemical technology)? 
A further factor affecting the health of the CWC regime is the poten-
tial risk associated with the research and development of new chemicals
and production processes. Although a good deal of such R&D will lead
to innovations unrelated to the object and purpose of the CWC, a rela-
tively small segment of such activities might affect the treaty. A good
example is the area of “non-lethal” incapacitants, which are of growing
interest to several countries for counter-terrorism operations. Although
such developments exploit the “law enforcement” exemption in the
CWC, they are increasingly being applied for paramilitary purposes. In
theory, the OPCW has the necessary instruments to address this prob-
lem, such as the Scientific Advisory Board, yet this topic has been con-
sidered too sensitive even to be raised at the organisation’s meetings.
Sooner or later, an in-depth review of the implications for the CWC of
advances in chemical science and technology will be in order. As to the
problem of “non-lethal agents”, one should recall that the CWC covers
incapacitating agents (non-lethal agents) and not just agents designed to
kill. According to Art. II, para 2, “Toxic Chemical means… any chemi-
cal which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans and animals…”
If a state has riot-control agents, it must declare the types and may not
use them as a method of warfare. In that sense, despite deliberately
vague language defining non-prohibited purposes (“law enforcement,
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including domestic riot control”). If a state has riot-control agents, it
must declare the types and may not use them as a method of warfare,
despite deliberately vague language defining non-prohibited purposes
(“law enforcement, including domestic riot control”). Thanks to the
General Purpose Criterion, there seems to be no gap in the CWC cov-
erage of various chemicals. Since September 11, however, the fight
against terrorism has led to intensified research on new chemical com-
pounds with very rapid incapacitating or irritant effects, along with the
development of new means of delivery and dispersal. According to press
accounts, in several instances the same delivery systems have been
designed in different versions for law enforcement and battlefield use.
Such development work is eroding the boundary between the permit-
ted use of riot-control agents for law enforcement purposes and the
CWC’s prohibition on their use as a method of warfare.
At the same time, a frontal approach to the “non-lethal problem” may
not be productive. One should bear in mind that the negotiators of the
CWC deliberately created ambiguity in the treaty text about the mean-
ing of the term “law enforcement, including domestic riot control”. It is
therefore important to develop greater understanding of the issue and
explore ways of providing greater transparency. As a first step, one could
look into a possible exchange of information about national legal and
administrative norms governing research and development in the area of
incapacitating agents to ensure that the integrity of the CWC is not at
risk. National implementation, an important safeguard against abuse, is
very relevant in this case as well. Indeed, the Article VI .2 requirement
that “Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that
toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, oth-
erwise acquired, retained, transferred or used within its territory or in
any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not pro-
hibited under this Convention.”, if properly complied with, will take
care of much of the problem.
9. Second CWC Review Conference - The Forum to Address
Challenges and a Challenge  Itself
A good opportunity to address future challenges to the CWC and the
OPCW will come at the Second Review Conference, which has been
scheduled for April 2008.The Executive Council of the OPCW has already
set up an open-ended working group (OEWG) under UK chairmanship to
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prepare for it. The OPCW established a similar OEWG before the First
Review Conference, and the decision to do so again reflects the organisa-
tion’s special role and comprehensive mandate for treaty implementation.
The Second Review Conference will be an important event that will,
ideally, contribute to strengthening the CWC regime and the political
commitment of the States Parties. Nevertheless, the nature of several
problems of treaty implementation requires that they be worked on
before, during, and after the Review Conference, so that limiting analy-
sis  to what should happen at the conference itself might leave a num-
ber of important questions unanswered.
The preferred outcome would be a short, dynamic political declaration
expressing strong support for the CWC and its effective implementa-
tion, backed by a longer text that addresses various important issues,
including the progress in CW destruction, verification and compliance,
universality and national implementation, counter-terrorism, economic
and technological development and chemical security. Without neces-
sarily trying to resolve all these issues once and for all, the Review
Conference should chart the course of work over the next five-year
inter-sessional period and, wherever possible, introduce the required
innovations.
Hopefully, the Conference will be able to send out a convincing mes-
sage that chemical disarmament is on track and  that States Parties feel
assured of its ultimate success. To reinforce this message, the Review
Conference would be well advised to develop a preliminary vision of
the OPCW in a chemical weapons-free world. To this end, the confer-
ence should address future priorities and structural reforms that will be
needed once all of the declared CW stockpiles have been destroyed.
Even if no detailed or final decisions can be taken at that early stage, the
Review Conference could still instruct the Executive Council to begin
systematic work on those issues.
10. Can the CWC Still Be a Trailblazing Treaty?
The relevance and the future of international agreements depend, to
some degree, not only on the difference they make in the specific areas
they are supposed to regulate, but also on their impact on activities and
processes in other fields. When the Chemical Weapons Convention was
adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, it was often
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hailed  as an example for future agreements on arms control and disar-
mament. Indeed, in the 1990s it served as at least an inspiration for the
1997 Model Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements
(INFCIRC 540), which significantly improved the safeguards system
and, in a much more direct way, as a model for negotiations on the ver-
ification provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on the
Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Attempts to use the CWC as a model have not been entirely successful.
In 2007, the CTBT, concluded in 1996, is still very far from entering
into force, although for reasons that have little to do with verification.
All that notwithstanding, it may be claimed that the CWC has already
played an important role in disarmament areas beyond its “direct sphere
of responsibility” and that the problems encountered in the cases of the
CTBT and the BWC have more to do with the general attitudes towards
disarmament than with the deficiencies of the CWC model.
So, the question remains: can the CWC or, rather, the approaches built into
it, provide an example to follow for other arms control areas? The response,
it seems, could be cautiously positive, with the understanding that under no
circumstances can a treaty, or its individual provisions, be automatically
copied to resolve issues for which this treaty was not intended.
Rather promising in this sense could be a set of approaches that the
CWC offers in the area of verification and compliance (barring, of
course, technicalities that are specific to chemical weapons or the chem-
ical industry and certain implementation aspects where OPCW per-
formance leaves something to be desired). Among these approaches the
following are of particular importance:
a) almost comprehensive coverage by the verification system, cou-
pled with an international mechanism (organisation with both polit-
ical and technical arms) responsible for the whole range of compli-
ance issues;
b)  a mix of cooperative and more forceful verification techniques,
with the general emphasis on the former;
c) diversity of tools available to initiate inspections, depending on the
degree of sensitivity – from the Technical Secretariat to individual
member states;
d)  diversity of the types of inspections with varying intrusiveness,
depending on the risk posed to the CWC regime by respective chem-
icals, facilities and activities, as well as on the need to reduce as much
as possible inconveniences to legitimate activities and to insure pro-
tection of confidential information;
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e)  the combination of routine inspections with a potential threat of
challenge inspections, the latter representing a politically charged dou-
ble-edged sword and a powerful deterrent, realistically available to any
State Party, but  with a set of disincentives against  abusive or irrespon-
sible use and, in terms of implementation procedures, reliance on man-
aged access to help the inspected Party demonstrate its compliance
without compromising unrelated sensitive information;
f)   the important  role in ensuring compliance and building over-all
transparency and confidence assigned to procedures other than inspec-
tions, including assistance to member states in compiling correct and
comprehensive declarations, intensive cooperation with national
authorities responsible for CWC implementation on the national level
(including  training of  national authorities’ personnel), and  putting in
place comprehensive systems of national legislation to empower respec-
tive governments to police the CWC on  a national level, to deter and
punish not only the violators, but also those who, by omission or inten-
tionally complicate the verification activitis of the OPCW;
g) and, finally, a very innovative, multi-optional approach to dealing
with suspected or presumed violations, which is focused, in the first
place, on the need to guarantee compliance and reverse the negative sit-
uation, rather than on labelling and punishing suspected violators in sit-
uations that may not be crystal clear. In other words the logic of the
CWC compliance provisions is first to impose on a suspected violator
very specific measures it should perform in order to return to the state
of compliance (e.g. declare a certain facility, accept a special investiga-
tive visit there, remove certain elements of the facility or close it down
– all depending on the circumstance of the case). And only if the pre-
scribed measures are not carried out within certain timeframes, is a
judgement on non-compliance passed.
Apart from the above mentioned approaches, which could be applica-
ble, with necessary fine tuning, to a number of arms control and disar-
mament measures, there are some less obvious features of the CWC
regime that could also be of some relevance. For example, the gradual
introduction of the verification measures (not immediately after the
entry into force). In the CWC, this approach is used in relation to
inspections of the OCPFs on the assumption that the first step has to be
the establishment of some sort of a database of inspectable facilities.
This element is somewhat obscured by the fact that in general the CWC
verification and implementation regime, as negotiated  in Geneva,
turned out to be excessively “front-loaded” – that is to say that too many
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activities were expected both of the individual member states and of the
OPCW immediately after the entry into force of the Convention. (In
reality this front-loading resulted in a number of cases of “technical non-
compliance”, due to the fact that many states were simply not able to
adopt in time the complicated legislation needed to implement all the
provisions correctly, especially with regard to industry verification.)
This incremental approach to verification may prove useful with regard
to a number of possible arms reduction steps, where immediate full
compliance may be a difficult objective to achieve. Retrospectively, it
might have been wiser to use this approach also with regard to some
other types of CWC inspections, including challenge inspections.
In short, there are a number of lessons to be learned from both the
negotiations and the implementation of the CWC that could have a sig-
nificant value for other arms control, disarmament and non-prolifera-
tion efforts, even including nuclear disarmament. However, the main
question is whether the international community will be able to over-
come its current nihilistic attitude towards serious disarmament meas-
ures – something that must be done sooner or later to prevent not just
a bilateral arms race of the kind we observed during the Cold War, but
a multiple, not always symmetrical, arms race with several protagonists,
which would be much more difficult to bring under control.
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1. Introduction
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
(CWC) was signed in 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997.
This year, marking the tenth anniversary of the Convention’s entry into
force, it is appropriate to point out its major achievements in the field
of disarmament. In addition to the control system, which will be
addressed by other speakers, its greater success has been in the field of
integrity and universality.
Integrity means that reservations cannot be appended to the text of the
CWC. They are admissible only to the Annexes, provided they are not
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty itself (Article
XXII). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 19)
states that a reservation which is excluded by the text of the treaty can-
not be formulated. However, practice shows that States often try to cir-
cumvent that prohibition through recourse to understandings or decla-
rations. Another device is for the body authorising the executive to rat-
ify the treaty to formulate a list of interpretative understandings. Such
devices have also been applied to the CWC, albeit in a moderate way if
compared to other multilateral treaties, such as the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. The most understandings have been drawn up by the
United States, following its practice of “national interpretation” of
treaties to which it is a Party. Congress listed a number of “reservations”,
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stating that it had the right to do so, notwithstanding Article XXII of
the Convention.1 Yet, given the prohibition on reservations, including
interpretative reservations, national interpretations are inadmissible,
since international law dictates rules on treaty interpretation (embodied
in the pertinent articles of the Vienna Convention) reflecting custom-
ary international law. In any case, the CWC also establishes a procedure
for settling disputes, including those related to interpretation of the
Convention.
Universality is a characteristic of multilateral disarmament treaties. If
the treaty is ratified by only a few States, the treaty is ineffective. The
most concerned  States, i.e. those having chemical weapons and/or capa-
ble of building them (a process which has become quite easy) should
ratify the Convention. The CWC is almost universal: 182 States have
ratified, only 13 States have not. Of the 13 States, 6 are signatories. It
should be remembered that signatory States, while not obliged to abide
by the Convention, are nevertheless obliged to refrain from actions con-
trary to the object and purpose of it, unless they have made clear their
intention not to become a Party (the rule, embodied in Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, is declaratory of customary
international law).
Constant efforts are made to encourage non-Party States to ratify the
CWC. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) has played a significant role in this connection, for instance by
convening regional conferences. The role of NGOs should also not be
neglected. In some instances, a stalemate may depend on reciprocal mis-
trust and the linkage with atomic deterrence, as in the cases of Israel and
Egypt. According to some observers, this impasse could be overcome
with the creation of a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), but this argument is questionable.
In addition to integrity and universality, non-discrimination is also con-
sidered a distinctive feature of the CWC. Non-discrimination is a char-
acteristic of all disarmament treaties, unlike non-proliferation treaties –
such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which make a dis-
tinction between a few States lawfully in possession of weapons and
States which, on the contrary, are not allowed to detain them. The ques-
tion of non-discrimination has come into consideration, as far as the
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CWC is concerned, in connection with Article XI (Economic and
Technological Development) and the export controls that Western
states still apply vis-à-vis States Parties to the CWC.2 Account has to be
taken of the Security Council resolutions against the proliferation of
WMD, and the measures they dictate on export control, such as in res-
olution 1540 of 24 April 2004. The articles on technological develop-
ment set down in disarmament and non-proliferation treaties should be
read in conjunction with those resolutions.
2. The continuing relevance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
The lack of universality and the danger of non-application of the
Convention in time of armed conflict make the 1925 Geneva Protocol
on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare an instrument that is
still valuable. Its continuing and permanent validity is reaffirmed by the
CWC, in both the Preamble and Article XIII. The Protocol and the
CWC are of a different nature and have different functions. The former
is an instrument of international humanitarian law, prohibiting the use of
chemical weapons (CW), but allowing States to produce and keep them.
The latter is an instrument of disarmament obliging States not to pro-
duce CW and to destroy existing stocks. It is also an instrument of inter-
national humanitarian law, since States are obliged not to use CW.
However, unlike the Protocol which allows the use of CW by way of
reprisal, the CWC prohibits use under “any circumstances”, with the
consequence that Parties are obliged not to use CW even for reprisal.The
CWC does not abrogate the Protocol – not even inter partes. As stated in
the Preamble, the CWC “complements” the Protocol. There are three
reasons why the Protocol still maintains its importance:
- There are a number of States (i.e. Egypt and Israel) which have not
ratified the CWC, but have ratified the Protocol.
- The CWC is stipulated for an unlimited duration. However, it con-
tains a clause (Article XVI) allowing a Party to withdraw if its
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supreme interests are in jeopardy. The withdrawal is made condition-
al upon notification of the intention to do so to the United Nations
Security Council, the other Parties and the Executive Council of the
CWC and takes effect only 90 days after the notification has been
made. Those entities and in particular the Security Council may
intervene to cool off the crisis. However, as North Korea has shown
in connection with its intention to withdraw from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, a State cannot be prevented from abandoning a
disarmament treaty. In such a case, the 1925 Protocol becomes very
important because, if it is Party to it, the State still has the obliga-
tion not to use CW.
- In case of war between two or more parties, the fate of disarma-
ment treaties are doubtful. They are terminated or at least suspend-
ed. This conclusion  may be applied to the CWC, even though the
effect of war on this particular treaty was not raised during its nego-
tiation (one may refer to the control system, but it is nonsense to
claim that a challenge inspection which might jeopardy the security
of the inspected State might be carried out!). Even if the treaty is not
automatically terminated in time of war, a Party can always with-
draw, invoking extraordinary events jeopardizing its security (Article
XVI). Unlike disarmament treaties, international humanitarian law
treaties such as the 1925 Protocol continue to apply in wartime and
have been stipulated taking into account that they will be applied in
war, as is made explicit  in the text of the Protocol.
3. The CWC and humanitarian law
One of the main characteristics of the CWC is that it is both a disarma-
ment treaty and a convention embodying provisions of humanitarian
law, unlike the BWC which deals only with disarmament (even though
one could say that the obligation not to use BW is implicit since you
cannot use what you do not have).
Article I of the CWC obliges States:
a) not to use CW;
b) “never” to use such weapons “under any circumstances”.
Unlike the 1925 Protocol, reprisals are therefore forbidden under the
CWC.
It would be opportune for all States Parties of the CWC that have made
a reservation to the 1925 Protocol, stating that they remain free to use
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such weapons by way of reprisal (namely reprisals in kind to react
against the  use of CW by the enemy), to withdraw them. In effect, a
number of States party to the CWC (i.e., Australia, Belgium, France and
Chile) withdrew their reservations to the Protocol even before the
CWC was concluded.
Another important feature is that the CWC is applicable in any kind of
conflict, international or internal. The debate on whether the Protocol
applies only in time of international armed conflict – since it relates to
“war” – is too well known to be repeated here. The Convention applies
“under any circumstances” and therefore does not allow for any circum-
vention of the obligation not to use CW.
4. The CWC and customary international law
The CWC in itself (i.e. in all its provisions) is not declaratory of custom-
ary international law. Hence a State is not subject to challenge inspec-
tions unless it has ratified the Convention. The obligation not to pro-
duce or destroy CW cannot likewise be considered as belonging to cus-
tomary international law.
On the contrary, it is now almost unanimously held that the duty not to
use CW stems from a norm of customary international law, binding all
States of the international community – be they Party to the 1925
Protocol and the CWC or not. This has been stated recently by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on interna-
tional law and customary international law. Does customary internation-
al law also prohibit the use of chemical weapons for reprisal against first
use of this kind of weapon by the enemy? 
As said earlier, the 1925 Protocol does not prohibit reprisals against the
first use of chemical weapons. A number of States have made a reserva-
tion to this effect. However, the lawfulness of a reprisal in kind is not
subject to the formulation of an ad hoc reservation. Even if a State has
not formulated a reservation, reprisal is possible if admitted by general
international law.The CWC prohibits reprisals in kind and the provision
on reciprocity contained in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties – according to which a treaty is suspended or terminat-
ed for a material breach of the other Party – cannot be invoked in
respect of “the provisions relating to the protection of the human per-
sons contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to
provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by
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such treaties”. Therefore the prohibition never to use CW is not subject
to reciprocity since it is formulated for protecting human beings.
A number of arguments militate for stating that customary internation-
al law prohibits not only the use of chemical weapons, but also their use
by way of reprisal. The CWC Preamble contains lofty language, stating
that States are “determined for the sake of all mankind to exclude com-
pletely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”. Almost all States
of the international community are Party to the CWC, which forbids
reprisals.A number of countries withdrew their reservations to the 1925
Protocol, by which they reserved the right to employ CW as a reaction
to prior use by the enemy. Moreover, it is stated, for instance in the UK
Military Manual,3 that States party to the CWC are forbidden to use
CW by way of reprisal under Article I(1) of the CWC and that the
Convention does not permit any reservations. One can therefore state
that reprisals are forbidden under treaty law, but it is doubtful whether
the prohibition of reprisal in kind under the CWC is declaratory of cus-
tomary international law rather a development in this field. On this
point, the ICRC study on customary international law does not provide
the last word; it only states that, under general international law, “there
is increasing evidence that it may be unlawful to retaliate in kind to
another State’s use of chemical weapons”.4
5. The criminality of chemical warfare
The criminality of chemical warfare is now an established principle of
international law. Article 8, paragraph 2 (b) )(xviii) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) qualifies “employing asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, material or devices”
as a war crime.The language used  is similar to that of the 1925 Protocol
(even though BW are not mentioned there). As far as the criminality of
employing prohibited weapons is concerned, Article 8 of the ICC
Statute covers only international armed conflict and does not address
non-international armed conflict. One could therefore argue that the
use of CW during an international armed conflict is not only prohibit-
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ed, but also amounts to a crime of war, while the use of the same
weapon during a non-international armed conflict is only prohibited but
cannot be qualified as a crime of war. This conclusion, however, would
run counter to the case-law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia, which has established that the prohibition to use non-per-
mitted means of warfare should be regarded as a war crime whether the
forbidden weapons are used during an international or an internal
armed conflict.5
Article VII, paragraph. 1 (a), of the CWC obliges States parties to enact
penal legislation in order to prevent individuals from undertaking an
activity prohibited by the Convention. However, the CWC does not
qualify the prohibited activity as a war crime.
Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which employed CW during the Iran-Iraq
war to arrest the counteroffensive of the Iranian army, was an important
importer of substances destined for the production of CW. Shipments
originating in the West were in contravention of the prohibition. On 23
December 2005, The Hague District Court (Criminal Section) con-
demned Mr. van Anraat to 15 years imprisonment for having supplied
Iraq with chemicals used to produce CW. The criminal activity was
committed before the entry into force of the CWC and the judgment
applied Dutch criminal law of the time.6 The sentence was confirmed
by The Hague Court of Appeal (9 May 2007) and the penalty increased
to 17 years of imprisonment.
6. Controversial issues
Notwithstanding that it took the Conference on Disarmament and
negotiators several years to conclude the CWC, a number of issues still
fall into grey areas and are open to controversy. This is inevitable in
these kind of negotiations where consensus is often reached thanks to
what is called “diplomatic ambiguity”.
The controversial issues to be considered are: herbicides, riot control
agents, and non-lethal weapons.
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Herbicides are not included in the body of the Convention, since this
would have meant prohibiting them for any kind of use, for instance
for cleaning the perimeter of military camps. 7 During the negotia-
tions, the proponents of a provision on herbicides recalled their wide-
spread use during the Vietnam war to defoliate forests and prevent
them from being used as sanctuaries by North Vietnamese soldiers
and South Vietnam insurgents. Herbicides were also used in coun-
terinsurgency operations in Malaysia to clean the jungle. The 1925
Protocol does not contain any explicit prohibition on herbicides and
the United States took this position in 1975 when it adhered to the
Protocol. The compromise reached at Geneva was to confine herbi-
cides to the Preamble, “recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the
pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law, of
the use of herbicides as a method of warfare”. The prohibition there-
fore relates only to the use of herbicides as a method of warfare as
they were employed in Vietnam by the United States and its allies.
Moreover, the Preamble refers to the pertinent agreements, which are
the Enmod Convention and Protocol I, additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The Enmod Convention and Protocol I do not
specifically address herbicides. However they ban means and meth-
ods of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause
“widespread, long-lasting or severe damage to the natural environ-
ment” (Enmod Convention) or “widespread, long-lasting and severe
damage to the natural environment” (Articles 35, para. 3 and 55,
para. 1 of Protocol I). The latter provision deals with the repercus-
sions of the damage caused by prohibited means and methods of war-
fare on the health or survival of the civilian population as herbicides
employed on a large scale have a toxic effect on human beings. The
Preamble also refers to the relevant principles of international law,
thereby reflecting the opinion that herbicides are prohibited as a
method of warfare. This opinion, expressed by the framers of the
Convention, is now shared by almost all members of the internation-
al community as Parties to the CWC. The United States, however,
does not consider herbicides specifically prohibited by either the
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1925 Protocol or the CWC, even though it has “formally renounced
the first use of herbicides in time of armed conflict, except for con-
trol of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their
immediate perimeters”.8
Riot control agents are forbidden by the CWC as a method of  warfare
(Article. I, paragraph 5), but are allowed for “law enforcement including
domestic riot control purposes” (Article II, paragraph 9 d).9 The 1925
Protocol does not state any particular prohibition on riot control agents
(e.g. tear gases) and several States, including the United States, affirm
that they are not prohibited by the Protocol, even though they have
declared that they will not resort to their first use in war, since this
would provoke an escalation of the conflict.
The CWC partly clarifies the issue: it is certain that riot control agents
may be employed for law enforcement and it is equally certain that they
cannot be employed as a method of warfare. The definition of riot con-
trol agents by the CWC is also of some help. Article II, paragraph 7,
gives the following definition of riot control agents: “any chemical not
listed in a schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irri-
tation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following termination of exposure”.
But some doubts remain. First of all, the quantity detained in stock is
important, since a large quantity might be suspicious and could be
employed for a purpose prohibited by the Convention.
Then, while it is certain that riot control agents cannot be employed as a
method of warfare in time of an international armed conflict, it is not
sure that the same prohibition applies in the event of a civil war, since
the established government can always state that it is using the chemi-
cals for law enforcement. The regulation of international armed conflict,
too, is not exempt from uncertainty. A State is obliged not to use tear
gases in the battlefield, but what about their use to quell a rebellion in a
prisoner of war camp or an occupied territory? A further doubt is relat-
ed to peacekeeping operations. Are peacekeepers authorized to use tear
gases in a non-combat situation? The UN Secretary General Bulletin,
issued on 8 August 1999 on the principles of international humanitarian
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law to be applied by peacekeeping forces, outlaws “the use of asphyxiat-
ing, poisonous or other gases”, but does not clarify the point under con-
sideration (paragraph 6.2, section 6, ST/SGB/1999/13). According to
some authorities, riot control agents may lawfully be used in normal
peacekeeping, counter-terrorist and hostage or downed pilot rescue oper-
ations. The same is true for controlling riots in occupied areas, prisoner
of war camps, military prisons or other non-combat situations.10
In recent years, armies have shown increasing interest in non-lethal
weapons (NLW).11 The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict gives
this definition of NLW: “Non-lethal weapons are weapons that  are
explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel,
with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable
equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environ-
ment”. Examples given by the Manual include “water cannon, plastic
bullets, CS gas, stun grenades, electronic jammers and laser weapons”.
They make it possible to select a target without causing death to civil-
ians – a useful effect particularly when a military target is intermingled
with civilian population. Another advantage is that they are, in princi-
ple, not deadly and thus tolerated more by the public opinion.
The issue with NLW is whether they are compatible with the prohibi-
tions laid down by the CWC. NLWs cause only temporary incapacita-
tion. Chemical weapons are weapons that cause death or other harm
through the toxic properties of the chemicals used. It follows that an
NLW may fall into the category of CW if it causes temporary incapaci-
tation or permanent harm to humans through its chemical action. CS
gas belongs to the category of riot control agents and its use is lawful,
provided that it is not employed as a method of warfare. CS gases pro-
duce their effect on the skin and not inside the body. Other gases cause
effects inside the body at the brain level, such as disorientation, sedation
or even unconsciousness. Malodorants and calmatives are also referred
to as examples of NLWs.
Many NLWs other than riot control agents can be considered chemicals
employed for purposes not prohibited under the CWC, as stated in
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Articles II, paragraph. 9. In this connection, the main problem is repre-
sented by the definition of “law enforcement”. For instance, execution of
a death penalty with a lethal injection falls within the notion of law
enforcement. On the contrary, the use of NLWs in warfare is not law
enforcement. Yet there are grey areas between these two which are nei-
ther properly law enforcement nor warfare. For instance, a peacekeep-
ing operation. What about the use of non-scheduled chemicals? On 26
October 2002, the Russian Federation employed non- scheduled chem-
icals to free hostages held by Chechen rebels in a theatre in Moscow.
The anti-terrorist squad successfully accomplished its mission. Yet, a
number of people were killed, both among the hostages and the terror-
ists: 2 were shot dead by the Chechnen rebels and 129 died as a conse-
quence of the chemicals used. Others were later treated medically. The
Russians used fentanyl, a non-scheduled chemical under the CWC. Yet
the Russian raid was not brought up before the OPCW as a case of ille-
gal use of chemicals and a CWC violation. The OPCW only asked the
Russian authorities for information on the kind of chemical used.12
Conclusions 
These controversial issues have to be clarified. The question of the legal-
ity of NLWs is one of them. Armies are developing this category of
weapons. They are useful for law enforcement. But what about devel-
oping NLWs for military purposes or in connection with military pur-
poses? The employment of NLWs for anti-terrorist operations could be
particularly promising. However, it has to be remembered that chemi-
cal types and quantities should be consistent with purposes not prohib-
ited under the CWC (Article  II, paragraph. 1 a). There is a risk of pro-
liferation. The forthcoming Review Conference should also take into
consideration a number of issues related to tear gases, such as their use
by peacekeeping forces, in time of occupation and in non-international
armed conflicts. If this is clarified, the interest in convening an ad hoc
convention for regulating NLWs will diminish.
The forthcoming CWC Review Conference could provide a useful
opportunity. A review conference, by its nature, cannot amend the
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Convention. But it can help to clarify the most controversial issues.
Scientific developments can be exploited by countries to circumvent
the Convention, producing new chemicals that are not scheduled since
they were unknown when the Convention was drafted. The framers of
the Convention were aware of this danger and inserted a provision by
which the Review Conference “may take into account any relevant sci-
entific and technological development” (Article VIII, paragraph. 22).
It is also important that the goal of universality be reached. Very few
countries have not yet ratified the Convention. However their ratification
is important for upholding the strategic balance, namely in the Middle
East. But this is a task for diplomacy and not for a review conference.
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Introduction
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the
CWC, it is appropriate to ask what distinctive features of this arms con-
trol and disarmament regime account for its relative success. The first is
that the regime constitutes a non-discriminatory and serious combina-
tion of arms control and disarmament measures. This distinguishes the
CWC from the NPT, which is highly discriminatory, and from the
BWC, which is more symbolic than serious. The second feature is the
system of compliance control. Its design compares favourably with that
of other regimes.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the compliance system in a
comparative perspective. The core of this system is made up of various
fact-finding procedures, called verification. Any evaluation of the per-
formance of the CWC regime has to address the issue of verification.
This paper proposes to do so in a comparative perspective, i.e. analyse
CWC verification together with other compliance systems in the field
of arms control and disarmament. There is an even broader perspective
behind this approach as compliance systems are an important part of
other treaty regimes as well nowadays, in particular in the field of inter-
national environmental law. Modern procedures to ensure compliance
with international law owe their progress mainly to two fields: interna-
tional environmental law and the law of arms control and disarmament.
Although the safeguards system developed under the NPT has in many
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respects set the example, it is the CWC with its comprehensive verifi-
cation approach which has established the standards, at least in the field
of arms control, but perhaps also in other fields.1 The arms control ver-
ification systems that have been negotiated but not put into practice
(the BWC Verification Protocol – not adopted; the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty [CTBT] – not ratified) clearly owe very much to the CWC
system, despite all the differences which will be addressed. This paper
tries to analyse the design of this system as a tool to deal with security
concerns.
The CWC establishes verification systems in relation to four different
obligations, namely the obligation to:
- destroy chemical weapons in the possession of a country;
- destroy old or abandoned chemical weapons;
- destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities;
- ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only used for
purposes not prohibited by the Convention, i.e. are not diverted to
weapons purposes.
The first three obligations are disarmament obligations. The latter is an
arms control obligation, it is designed to prevent new armaments. It is
in particular this latter one which invites a comparison with other treaty
regimes. The other treaties to be considered are the NPT, the BWC
(including its Draft Verification Protocol) and the CTBT. The NPT and
the CTBT are arms control, not disarmament treaties. The BWC was
originally, like the CWC adopted much later, both a disarmament and
arms control treaty, but the negotiated verification system only address-
es the arms control aspect.
A basic difference between the four treaty regimes is that the NPT, the
CWC and the CTBT establish an elaborate compliance system, while
the BWC as it stands provides only for a complaint to the Security
Council. While the compliance system of the NPT, the CWC and the
CTBT also ends with the Security Council, seizing the Council is a
means of last resort. It is preceded by an elaborate fact-finding system
Michael Bothe
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which normally would make recourse to the Council unnecessary. As to
the BWC, the creation of such a system has been rendered impossible
by the adamant opposition of the U.S. to a draft Verification  Protocol
which was very close to being adopted by the Fifth Review Conference
in 2001/2002.2 The provisions of the draft Protocol will nevertheless
be included in the following comparative analysis of the design of arms
control mechanisms.
1. The quest for efficiency: the reliability of measures to ensure compli-
ance
In order to evaluate the verification systems in question, it is useful to
recall the fundamental conflict of interest which they have to solve.
There is a fundamental contradiction between the States’ interests. On
the one hand, the system must be reliable in order to provide security.
Thus, it must be possible to ascertain all facts relevant in respect of com-
pliance. This requires a certain intrusiveness of the system. On the other
hand, States have an interest in not being exposed to intrusive scrutiny.
At least some of that interest is legitimate. It starts with the safety of the
processes in which relevant materials are handled and keeping commer-
cial and industrial secrets and ends with military security. These con-
flicting interests must be balanced in the design of the fact-finding pro-
cedures.
The major elements of this balance will be described in the following
section.
The legal bases for the fact-finding procedures are somewhat different.
The NPT (Art. III) only establishes the duty of the non-nuclear weapons
states (NNWS) to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the pur-
pose of verifying their compliance with the treaty obligations. Although
the IAEA had already conducted some supervision of nuclear activities
before the conclusion of the NPT based on guidelines published in the
Information Circular (INFCIRC) 66/Rev.2, a new system was designed
2 For a statement of the course of events see the Final Document of the Fifth Review
Conference, BWC.CONF.V/17; for an analysis of the draft Additional Protocol to the BWC
see Onno Kervers, Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: the
Draft Protocol, 8 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 161 (2003).
for the safeguards under the NPT in the form of a model agreement
(INFCIRC 153).3 This was then developed in a substantial way through
a Model Additional Protocol in 1997.4 While these model agreements
shape the system, the legal basis for each state remains the individual
bilateral agreement. In the case of the CWC and the CTBT, on the other
hand, the essential content of the verification system is regulated in the
multilateral treaty itself and its annexes. The same would apply for the
BWC Verification Protocol.
2. The accommodation of conflicting interests in compliance regimes:
intrusiveness vs. secrecy 
The balance between the interests just described is reflected in the
design, i.e. in a number of details of the inspection regimes. They are
all different. It has to be remembered that the content of any verifi-
cation system depends, first of all, on the content of the relevant obli-
gation. The CTBT relates to a particular activity, namely explosions
which may constitute a nuclear weapons test. This has a definite
impact on the design of the verification system. The other three
regimes are concerned, instead, with diverting materials or facilities
from a legitimate civilian to a prohibited military use. But as the
materials and facilities are different, the verification systems most
also be different.
For obvious practical reasons, the CTBT can rely to a large extent on a
non-intrusive verification method, namely long-distance monitoring,
e.g. through the collection of seismic and other data.5 The other systems
essentially rely on on-site verification.
In this respect, one basic distinction is the difference between routine
inspections on the one hand and ad hoc (challenge) inspections on the
other. In respect of the former, the general framework of the inspections
is known beforehand. It is thus relatively easy to design a sophisticated
system drawing a fine balance. That being so, the basic problem of a sys-
tem limited to routine inspections is that there can be facilities which
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are outside the scope of these inspections. The NPT, the CWC and the
BWC Verification Protocol use routine inspections, the CTBT does not.
It provides only for ad hoc on-site inspections.6
There are four key elements in the verification regimes which are cru-
cial for the balance of interests:
- scope of access;
- scope and means of fact-finding;
- confidentiality;
- reactions to stated or alleged violations.
As to the first element, controlled access, it is essential that on-site ver-
ification activities be possible only in relation to certain defined places.
It is only at these places that the State is subject to the intrusive control
of on-site inspections. As to the scope of fact-finding, the essential point
is that information relevant for the purpose of the verification process
is targeted, to the extent that it is really necessary. That information
must not become known to persons outside the circle of those who real-
ly need to know. This has to be ensured by appropriate guarantees. The
fact-finding ends with a statement of facts by the inspecting body. The
question of what happens if that statement points to some irregularity
is the most delicate part of the system.
2.1 Routine inspections  
2.1.1 Controlling access
Declarations. All four types of routine inspections under the CWC are
based on declarations. The locations where chemical weapons are stored
as well as the quantities of these weapons, the existence of old or aban-
doned chemical weapons on the territory of a State, and the location of
chemical weapons production facilities have to be declared.7 These dec-
larations are the starting point of the verification process.8
As to the arms control element of the CWC, the routine verification
process is designed to ascertain whether certain chemicals which have a
6 Article IV (D) CTBT.
7 Art. III CWC.
8 Verification Annex, Parts IV and V.
potential for being used for weapons purposes (but which also have
peaceful applications) are being diverted from civilian to forbidden mil-
itary uses. For this purpose, the States are obliged to declare all facilities
where specific chemicals are handled in specific quantities.9 It is in rela-
tion to these sites that routine verification takes place. This gives the
State a certain factual control over what is and what is not subject to
the verification process, and makes the sites to be inspected known
beforehand.
The draft BWC Verification Protocol also relies on an elaborate system
of declarations.10 But as the scope of the facilities to be declared is quite
extensive, the ensuing verification only covers a selected part of the
facilities.11 There are randomly selected transparency visits, voluntary
assistance visits and voluntary clarification visits.
In the case of the NPT safeguards according to INFCIRC 153, the
inspections take place in certain declared facilities at certain strategic
points only.12 After the experience with Iraq and North Korea which
proceeded their weapons’ programs outside these declared facilities, the
declaration duties and the rights of access were expanded in the
Additional Protocol. Under certain conditions, a right of access exists
even in relation to undeclared facilities.
The examples show that there are two problems inherent in a “declara-
tory” system: The first is whether the declarations are complete, the sec-
ond whether all or only a selection of the declared sites are to be
inspected. As to the first problem, the correctness of the declarations
made under the CWC are usually monitored, but the only way to ascer-
tain whether all relevant sites are declared is through challenge inspec-
tions.13 The selection process is regulated in various ways: comprehen-
sive inspection of all sites, random selection, risk related selection, selec-
tion based on quantitative thresholds.
Key data. Another element limiting the verification process is its con-
tent. The fact-finding is limited to certain key data. In the case of the
CWC arms control regime, the point of departure for identifying the
key data are lists of chemicals known to possess weapon potential. The
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9 Verfication Annex, Part VI sec. D, Part VII sec. A, Part. VIII sec. A, Part IX sec. A.
10 Art. 4 BWC Prot.
11 Art. 6 BWC Prot.
12 Lohmann, op. cit. p. 103, 205 et seq.
13 See below 3.2.
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routine on-site inspections are designed to assess the balance (input,
consumption, output) of these relevant chemical substances handled in
a particular facility. This is thought to be the decisive indicator by which
any diversion to prohibited purposes can be detected or excluded.
The concept of the NPT safeguards is based on similar considerations:
the diversion of materiel used for peaceful purposes to weapons purpos-
es should be excluded by controlling the materiel balances of the
nuclear fuel cycle. This is the core element of the INFCIRC 153 verifi-
cation system.14 As it became clear that the assumption underlying the
system was not quite true, i.e. that the verification of materiel balance
sheets was sufficiently reliable as an indicator of compliance, the scope
of fact-finding was substantially expanded by the Additional Protocol.
One of the difficult problems of the BWC is that the relevant materials are
not really known. Technologically, the field of biological warfare is much
more open to new developments. Nevertheless, the draft BWC Protocol
defines controlled substances and facilities in a very elaborate way.15
2.1.2 Limited publicity
The process of verification is strictly confidential. Confidentiality is
indeed a crucial issue of all verification systems. As a matter of princi-
ple, the data remain in the Secretariat which is obliged to guarantee
their confidentiality.16
2.2 Challenge inspections 
The possibility of challenge inspections, i.e. on-site inspections per-
formed on the request of a State which doubts whether another State
complies with its obligations, exists in the CWC, the BWC draft
Protocol and the CTBT. Under the NPT, their role is to a certain extent
fulfilled by special inspections which may, after consultations between
the Secretariat and the State concerned, be decided by the Board of
Governors.17
14 Lohmann, pp. 119 et seq.
15 Art. 4 and Annex A as well as Appendices.
16 NPT: Art. 15 Model Additional Protocol; CWC: Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information; BWC Prot.: Art. 11 and Annex C on confidentiality provisions. .
17 Lohmann, p. 209; INFCIRC 153, § 18.
2.2.1 The obligation to submit to challenge inspections
Under the CWC and the CTBT, the obligation to submit to challenge
inspections is rather strict. Under the CWC, there is only a limited
control against abuse exercised by the Executive Council.18 Under
the CTBT, the consideration of the Executive Council in admitting a
request is a rather formal one.19 In the case of the BWC draft
Protocol, the screening of a request for an “investigation” is more
complex.20
2.2.2 Measures of protection
On the other hand, the State which is subject to these inspections may
take certain measures to protect data. The rules concerning access to the
inspected sites are very detailed. The inspected State may limit access in
certain cases (managed access) (Part X of the Verification Annex, nos.
46 et seq). A similar regime applies to investigations pursuant to the
CTBT21 and the BWC draft Protocol.22
2.2.3 Limited publicity
As in the case of routine inspections, the process is strictly confidential.
2.3 Reactions 
The CWC and NPT verification systems are somehow based on the idea
of a self-fulfilling prophecy: their very existence should induce States to
comply and not to cheat. The fact that on-site inspections are indeed
carried out considerably increases the political cost of non-compliance
as the possibility of passing unnoticed decreases. Nevertheless, the issue
of reactions to non-compliance remains a serious one.23
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18 Art. IX para. 17
19 Art. IV paragraphs 39 et seq. CTBT and Part II para. 41 of the Additional Protocol.
20 Art. 9 para. 23 BWC Prot.
21 Art. IV paragraph 57 (b) CTBT and Part. II, paragraphs 86 et seq. of the Additional
Protocol.
22 Art. 9 Para. 23.
23 Alan Rosas, Reactions to non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in
Michael Bothe/Natalino Ronzitti/Alan Rosas (eds.), The New Chemical Weapons
Convention – Implementation and Prospects, The Hague et al. 1998, pp. 415 et seq., at 416.
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The path from verification to reaction to non-compliance is somewhat
different under the different treaty regimes.
Under the CWC, inspections are a task of the Technical Secretariat (TS).
The results, in the absence of any general reporting duties, thus remain
within the ambit of the Secretariat. Where the TS, however, has, as a
result of the verification activities, “doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties
about compliance”,24 it shall inform the Executive Council (EC). The
EC may then, inter alia, “request the State Party to take measures to
redress the situation”.25 If this request is not met, it may, inter alia, bring
the matter to the attention of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP).
The CSP shall “take the necessary measures to ensure compliance” with
the Convention.26 For that purpose, the CSP has three options:
- it may suspend the State’s “rights and privileges under this
Convention”;
- it may “recommend” “collective measures … in conformity with
international law”;
- it may bring the issue “to the attention of” the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Security Council (SC).
What the UNGA and/or the SC can do is a matter of their general pow-
ers and is not determined by the CWC. All in all, this system of enforce-
ment is not really, except for the fact that behind everything is the
Security Council, entitled to take enforcement action under the
Charter. In this respect, the systems established by the CTBT27 and the
BWC draft Protocol are very similar.28
In the case of the NPT, the technical evaluation of the information
received through the verification process is performed by the
Secretariat. If a positive finding of compliance by the Secretariat is not
possible, the Director General reports to the Board of Governors.29 The
latter may request the state, by a binding decision,30 to remedy the sit-
uation. In the case of persistent non-compliance, the Board of
Governors, according to Art. XIII.C of the IAEA Statute,
24 Art. VIII paragraph 40 CWC.
25 Art. VIII paragraph 36 CWC; art. 6 para. 104 draft BWC Prot. is comparable.
26 Art. VIII paragraph 21 (k).
27 Art. IV paragraph 65, V CTBT.
28 Art. 9 (I), 12. BWC Prot.
29 Lohmann, p. 236.
30 Lohmann, p. 244.
“shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations …”
As in the case of the CWC, these bodies’ powers concerning further
action depend on the Charter of the United Nations.
2.4 The special arms control measures decided by the Security Council: Iraq
and resolution 1540
Unlike the treaty regimes just described, the inspection system imposed
upon Iraq by the armistice resolution of the Security Council in 199131
was unlimited in law, limited in practice only by the lack of co-opera-
tion of the “host” State.After many had assumed that it was a failure and
that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction and a nuclear weapons
programme, it was found that the system had indeed been effective and
had discovered everything there was to discover.
The supervision system was established and modified by a series of
UNSC resolutions, beginning with resolution 687 (1991), and then con-
tinuing in particular with resolutions 1284 (1999) and 1441 (2002).
The legal basis for these resolutions was Art. 41 (non-military enforce-
ment measures), based on the assumption that the suspected presence
of WMD in the possession of Iraq constituted a threat to the peace.
Security Council resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004, which contains
measures to stop the proliferation of WMDs, is different. It expressly
reserves concerning existing treaty regimes. Its compliance control sys-
tem does not include any on-site inspections or the like; rather, it is
based on a system of State reports.32
2.5 Evaluation
Treaty regimes serve two different functions. The first is verification as a
means of confidence building. Both the CTBT33 and the BWC draft
Protocol34 provide for particular confidence-building measures in connec-
tion with verification. Participation in the system instils confidence and
gives assurances of security. In this respect, the systems can be considered
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31 Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991.
32 Paragraph 5 of the resolution.
33 Art. IV paragraphs 57 and 68 CTBT.
34 Art. 15 BWC Prot.
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successful. The CWC system works quietly and smoothly, with problems
lying in the details, not in the fundamental issues.35 The safeguard system
of the NPT covers all NNWS. It is significant for the acceptance of the
system that Brazil, Argentina and South Africa have joined it after having
renounced their nuclear option. The members of the former Soviet
Union, i.e. of a NWS, also gave up nuclear armament and joined the NPT
as NNWS. This would not have been possible had the safeguard system
not fulfilled its confidence-building function, at least grosso modo. The
question mark thus left brings us to the second function.
The second function is the prevention of cheating. In the light of the
compromise character of the systems which has been stressed above,
one could not expect them to be absolutely fool-proof. There have
been two cases of cheating – one can say two too much and conclude
that the NPT safeguard system has not been successful enough.
North Korea started cheating while it was still a party to the NPT.
Iraq cheated, too, and for a while successfully. It is only after the gen-
eral Security Council verification system was imposed on Iraq that
the programme was discontinued. This shows the pros and cons of
the current situation: the existing verification systems are not an
absolute guarantee against cheating, but the establishment of a sys-
tem as intrusive as the measures taken against Iraq is completely
unacceptable as a general principle.
3. Conclusions
How effective are the legal restraints on unlawful armaments and in
particular on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? The
answer seems to be the usual optimism/pessimism paradigm: Is the glass
half full or half empty? 
The C-weapons disarmament and arms control system seems to be in a
relatively stable condition. The safe destruction of the existing stocks
proceeds, not without problems, but it works. The inspection system
35 According to the annual reports of the OPCW, declarations have been submitted as
required, with some delays, as to chemical weapons possessed by States, chemical weapons
production facilities, riot control agents, facilities handling specific chemicals.The destruction
of chemical weapons and production facilities proceeds  (in some cases with delays) and is
verified. The routine inspection system is working with certain delays and sometimes subject
to budgetary restrictions.
designed to prevent diversion of chemical substances from peaceful to
military purposes has started functioning. No major problems are
reported.
The B-weapons system, on the other hand, relies for the time being
exclusively on hope. In the absence of anything like a serious system to
ensure compliance, the treaty remains symbolic rather than a real factor
restraining proliferation.
The NPT is of doubtful design. One may conclude that it has not con-
tained the circle of nuclear powers, but restrained its growth. Even
though it is one of the multilateral treaties with the broadest participa-
tion, it lacks the necessary universality because of the factual impor-
tance of the absentees. Its compliance system has worked reasonably
well, but timely discovery of non-compliance has not always been pos-
sible. The problem of governments pursuing a nuclear option remains
and may even become more acute. And whether the treaty can really
prevent nuclear weapons from getting into private hands also remains
to be seen. The fact that the NPT Review Conference held in 2005 was
unable to take any substantive decision on the various problems of the
NPT shows that this treaty regime is in crisis.
Even when and to the extent that verification systems work, reaction to
non-compliance or to armament by non-participants remains an open
issue. Legally speaking, it is in the hands of the Security Council – with
all the problems that entails. The unilateral option has also been used,
and remains a threat in the background.36
In a way, the CWC still stands alone as a model. It creates a non-discrim-
inatory disarmament regime (a distant and neglected goal of the NPT)
strictly controlled by an on-site verification system, as well as arms con-
trol measures equally under strict on-site control using both routine and
ad hoc inspections.Above all, the system works despite the technical dif-
ficulties and the transaction costs involved.
36 See the “Proliferation Security Initiative” announced by President Bush on 31 May 2003.
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The declared Chemical Weapons Stockpiles worldwide (Table 1), which
are the concern of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
amount to about 73,500 metric tons (MT), are situated in six countries.
About 97 percent of the total is held by the United States (US) and the
Russian Federation (RF) alone, with the balance in four other countries,
as is shown in the table below.
Tab. 1 - Declared CW Stockpiles in 6 Countries, 97 percent in US and RF
Russia 39,965 MT
Albania  16 MT
U.S.A. 31,495 ST
India 1,044 MT
A State Party* 300-1,000 MT
Libya 24 MT
The declared US stockpile originally consisted of 31,495 short tons
(ST). At this point, a cautionary note about numbers is in order.
Numbers should not be taken too literally in documents published on
this subject: sometimes, metric tons and short tons are not differentiated
and added together indiscriminately; at other times stockpile numbers
may refer to amounts declared before, or after, the entry into force of
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the CWC. Similarly, when looking at numbers dealing with countries’
pledges, commitments and money spent may not be differentiated,
without taking into account accounting differences arising between in-
country (RF) and home-country spending, or currency changes, such as
Euro/US dollar/Canadian dollar fluctuations.
Going back to the declared US stockpile, Map 1 shows the 9 US sites, 2
of which have been completed and dismantled – Johnston Atoll on the
bottom left, and Aberdeen, Maryland, near Washington DC; 5 sites are
now operating; and 2 have been delayed because of funding problems –
Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado.
On the far left of the map is the largest of the operating facilities in
Tooele, Utah, which alone accounts for 44 percent of the total US stock-
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pile, twice the size of the largest Russian stockpile. This illustrates the
first of two major differences between the US and RF stockpiles: the
diversity in size of the US stockpiles, while the RF stockpiles are more
evenly spread. The second difference is the stockpiles’ make-up: unlike
the Russian stockpiles, the US stockpiles often contain explosives and
propellants, making them more complex and therefore more costly to
disassemble and destroy.
Table 2 shows the different technologies that have been and are being
used to destroy the US stockpiles, and highlights the ongoing dispute
between incineration, i.e. thermal processing, at 5 of the 9 plants, and
neutralization, i.e. wet processing, at 4 of the plants. This points to a
second dispute, which is what to do with the waste product of the first
stage neutralization process: ship it to waste treatment facilities else-
where or treat it on-site. It is worth noting that the number of destruc-
tion facilities, nine, rose from the original three because of resistance to
shipping materials through communities and sometimes across states
for treatment at the three central destruction facilities originally
planned over twenty years ago.
Tab. 2 - U.S. CW Destruction Program
9 on-site destruction facilities:
5 incinerators (Johnston Atoll, Utah, Oregon, Alabama, Arkansas)
4 neutralization facilities (Maryland, Indiana, Colorado, Kentucky)
Table 3 shows the percentages destroyed to date (as of 11 March 2007)
at each of the 9 US facilities. The last four deserve attention. At
Newport, Indiana, although the VX nerve agent has been 45 percent
neutralized, there is a problem of what to do in the 2nd stage, that is,
how to dispose of the “reaction mass” (there seem to be “secret” plans to
ship it to Texas, across 8 state borders). This is a very different situation
from Aberdeen, Maryland where, following an accelerated program
after 9/11, secondary waste was shipped with little public comment
through Delaware to a Dupont industrial waste treatment facility in
New Jersey. Pueblo, which like Blue Grass is on hold for lack of fund-
ing, contains mustard agent, partly weaponised from the 1950s, which
citizens have made clear they want treated on-site, not stored or shipped
as secondary waste anywhere near local population centers. Finally,
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Blue Grass, the smallest stockpile but perhaps the most dangerous as it
is all weaponised, faces a projected completion date of 2023, which
places it 11 years behind schedule. The amount of extra funding esti-
mated to jumpstart construction at these two plants is an additional
US$ 200 million annually for the next several years, a modest sum com-
pared to the cost and importance of the overall program.
Tab. 3 - US CW Demilitarization (11 March 2007)
Johnston Atoll 1990-2000 100 percent destroyed
Aberdeen 2003-05/07 100 percent destroyed
Tooele 1996-2016 59 percent destroyed
Anniston 2003-2016 27 percent destroyed
Umatilla 2004-2018 24 percent destroyed
Pine Bluff 2005-2016 11 percent destroyed
Newport 2005-2012 45 percent neutralized
Pueblo 2012/13-2018/20 0 percent (2,520 ST)
Blue Grass   2012/13-2023 0 percent (630 ST)
Table 4 shows the deadlines for complete destruction of each of the six
countries’ stockpiles. With the RF having destroyed 20 percent and the
US 44 percent so far, both are “officially” to complete 100 percent
destruction by 29 April 2012; India, with about 70 percent so far, is to
complete by 28 April 2009; A State Party ( according to OPCW jargon)
with 80 percent to date, is to complete by 31 December 2008; Albania
with about 20 percent complete, is to finish destruction by June or July
2007 (29 April 2007 deadline); and Libya, which has not yet begun
destruction, is to complete it by 31 December 2010.
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Tab. 4 - CW Demil Deadlines
RF 29 April 2012
US 29 April 2012
India 28 April 2009
A State Party* 31 December 2008
Libya 31 December 2010
Albania 29 April 2007 **
** June/July 2007 likely completion
The official near-term deadlines are now: US 45 percent by 31
December 2007, about another 1,000 ST which is likely to be met; RF
20 percent by 29 April 2007, which has been officially met following
the recent agreement announced by the Director General of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and
45 percent by 31 December 2009. Though the US and RF both face
the 100 percent deadline of 29 April 2012, neither is expected to make
it. Among the four smaller possessor countries, three will likely meet
their deadlines, while Albania is expected to just miss the deadline date,
but for purely technical reasons, not for lack of good will.
* According to OPCW jargon.
Map 2 shows the locations and CW contents of each of the RF’s 7 stock-
piles: one – Gorny – has been completed; two – Kambarka and
Maradikova (also known as Maradikovsky or Mirny) – are operating; one
– Shchuch’ye – is delayed; and the remaining three – Pochep,
Leonidovka and Kizner – are still in the planning stage.
The RF sites’ projected destruction dates together with tonnage of CW
are shown in Table 5.
Tab. 5 - Russian CW Demilitarization
Gorny Dec 02 - Dec 05 (1,142 MT) completed
Kambarka 2005 –2009 (6,349 MT)
Maradikovsky 2006 – 2010 (6,890 MT)
Shchuch’ye 2008/2010-2012 (5,456 MT)
Pochep 2008 – 2012 (7,498 MT)
Leonidovka 2008 – 2012 (6,885 MT)
Kizner 2009 – 2012 (5,745 MT)
All seven Russian stockpiles (Table 6) are designed with neutralization
destruction facilities. Yet there is a problem of transportation here as
well. In this case they are considering shipping live agent and weapons
from Kizner to Shchuch’ye, where about 50 percent of the plant has
been completed, and transferring neutralized lewisite from Kambarka to
Gorny. The Leonidovka facility, one of the three still in the planning
stage, was to be constructed by Germany, but will now be purely
Russian.
Tab. 6 - R.F. CW Destruction Program
7 neutralization destruction facilities:
1 site – Gorny, Saratov Oblast – destroyed (1st stage process)
2 sites – Kambarka, Udmurtia and Maradikovsky, Kirov Oblast – operating
1 site – Shchuch’ye, Kurgan Oblast – 50 percent constructed
3 sites – Pochep, Bryansk Oblast; Leonidovka, Penza Oblast; and Kizner,
Udmurtia – in early planning and preconstruction
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It is clear from Table 7 that Russia still faces a considerable challenge to
complete its chemical weapons destruction. Indeed, experts believe it is
unlikely that it, like the US, will be able to meet all its obligations under
the CWC. Russia met its 1 percent deadline in April 2003, albeit after
a three-year extension from April 2000. Just a short time ago, Russia
declared 19 percent destroyed but only 16 percent had been credited by
the OPCW. So the recent agreement with the OPCW allowing full
credit as “destroyed”, subject to future verification, of the full 20 per-
cent is good news. The five and a half year extension to 31 December
2009 for the 45 percent to be destroyed still stands, as do the one-time
five-year extensions requested by both the US and the RF for 100 per-
cent destruction by 29 April 2012. However, in April 2006, the US
Department of Defense announced that the US would not be able to
meet this deadline.
Tab. 7 - Challenge for Russia
Completed 1 percent CWC deadline April 2003 
(after 3-year extension from April 2000)
Received new deadline for 20 percent to 29 April 2007 
(5-year extension from 2002)
Received new deadline for 45 percent to 31 December 2009 
(5.5 year extension from 2004)
Like the US, the RF requested a one-time extension for the 100 per-
cent deadline to 29 April 2012 
(5 year extension from 2007)
1. The economic challenge
Part of the problem is economic. Initial cost estimates, especially in the
US which started its CW destruction so much earlier, were wildly off the
mark. The estimated cost of total destruction of the US stockpile has
risen from US$ 2 billion to around US$ 40 billion. The Russian estimate
for total destruction of its CW stockpile, established a good ten years
after the US estimate, has risen from US$ 5-6 billion to US$ 8-10 billion.
In order to continue with the scheduled destruction, these economic
problems have to be tackled. Global Partnership (GP) funding and the
implementation of individual country pledges are top priorities. We also
need to promote public involvement and transparency –  the work of
our Green Cross public outreach offices – as an essential component for
all stakeholders to “buy into” and support CW destruction. Although
community investment is sometimes perceived as a purely Russian
responsibility, we encourage countries to look beyond “inside the fence”
limitations and help meet social and infrastructural needs of communi-
ties surrounding the CW stockpiles. There are plenty of examples, in
both the US and Russia, of paralysis of projects when these needs have
been ignored. Obviously emergency preparedness is paramount, as is
communication to the local populations. The same is true of environ-
mental and public health protection.
Total GP funding pledges (Table 8) illustrate the predominance of the
US’s US$ 10 billion and Russia’s roughly US$ 6 billion pledges, as well
as those from the remaining G8 state parties and the European Union.
Following the US and RF itself, the other principal donors are Canada,
Germany, Italy and the UK. Non-G8 countries are also important GP
donors. As noted earlier, there are often inconsistencies with the num-
bers, and with Euro pledges converted at current rates (2007), the US$
20 billion goal appears to have been easily exceeded. Yet turning
pledges into action is the problem.
Tab. 8 - Global Partnership – Total Funding
USA US$ 10 billion
Russia US$ 6 billion
Other G8 pledges:
Germany Euros 1.5 billion 
Canada Cdn $ 1 billion
EU Euros 1 billion
Italy Euros 1 billion
France Euros 750 million
U.K. US$ 750 million
Japan US$ 200 million
Though not complete, Table 9 shows the funding by the GP, with the
exception of Russia, for chemical weapons destruction alone (amounts
pledged and in some cases spent). Germany has been the biggest actual
spender to date, having completed the construction of the Gorny facil-
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ity, where destruction of the entire stockpile has been completed, and
the construction of the Kambarka facility, which is now operating.
Germany’s planned construction of the Leonidovka facility has been
cancelled by the RF’s Federal Agency of Industry (FAI). Instead, after
an intergovernmental agreement concluded on 15 March 2007,
Germany will spend “up to”  140 million to construct a complete
building in Pochep, with operation scheduled to begin in February 2009.
Italy had earlier pledged  320 million for Pochep, so it is not clear how
this pledge will be affected, or where it will be redirected.
Tab. 9 - Global Partnership – CW Funding
U.S. $ 1.039 Billion  Canada C$ 98.9 million
France Euros 250 million
Germany Euros 300 million
Italy Euros 365 million
Netherlands Euros 7.6 million
(+Euros 4.4million “under consideration”)
Norway Euros 100 million
European Union Euros 18 million
The reasons for the CW destruction delay are well known. At the top
of the list is financing, from the US, the RF and the GP. In the US,
Pueblo and Blue Grass are under-funded and money has been held up
for CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) funding of the Russian
Chemical Weapons Destruction program. As we know, the RF started
its own CWD funding ten years late. Technology issues have also caused
delays, such as for the second stage processing of neutralized agents.
Mismanagement and the inability to resolve the transportation issue –
whether to treat on-site or ship elsewhere – is the third main reason for
delay. Finally, the political situation of mistrust and mutual blame
between the US and the RF has also contributed to setbacks.
The implications of missing the CWC deadlines (Table 13) are not
yet known, and will doubtless be a matter for discussion at the 2nd
CWC Review Conference in 2008. As seen, of the smaller possessor
State Parties, one, Albania, is close to making the April 2007 deadline,
while three, India, Libya and A State Party (according to OPCW jar-
gon), will most likely meet their deadlines successfully. Both the
major possessor States, Russia and the US, are expected to miss the
2012 deadline by 4 to 12 years (although Russia still officially insists
that it will meet it).
In conclusion, what needs to be done is to 
- emphasize the critical importance of all donor states to fully fund
and implement their ongoing CW destruction programs;
- increase awareness and promote public discussion of the challenges
involved in meeting CWC deadlines, both at CWC 10th
Anniversary events, and elsewhere. Related current events, such as
the use of chlorine gas mixed with high explosives in Iraq, should
be underlined to heighten awareness;
- emphasize the universality of the CWC, and put pressure on the
thirteen countries which still need to be brought in, particularly
North Korea, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Somalia and Syria;
- improve US-RF relations and overcome recent differences.
There is a need for a renewed commitment to CW destruction. The
ultimate goal, which is to abolish all chemical weapons globally, must be
kept in sight. This can best be done by promoting transparency and tak-
ing no short-cuts on public health or the environment for budgeting or
any other reason.
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5. FROM PAPER TO REALITY:
VERIFICATION AND COST ISSUES
Alexander Kelle
Introduction
When key provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
were negotiated during the 1980s, it became clear that the destruction
of chemical weapon stockpiles and their verification would be one of
the core tasks to be accomplished once the treaty entered into force.
Accordingly, written into the treaty were not only the general principles
on which such activities would be based, but also a set of rather detailed
rules and procedures for the implementation of the disarmament obli-
gation of CW possessor States.
These chemical weapon (CW)-related stipulations, as set out on paper,
will be briefly reviewed in the first section of this paper. The second sec-
tion will then look into some aspects of the operationalisation of the
Convention’s CW destruction provisions, starting with the description
and analysis of an early episode in the CWC’s implementation involv-
ing a prolonged debate about how to calculate the reimbursable part of
the salary of an inspector verifying CW destruction in possessor States.
Since then, the magnitude of the task at hand has become increasingly
clear: this applies in particular to the CW stockpiles of the Russian
Federation and the US. Related problems and issues surrounding the
other CW possessor States will be discussed in the subsequent section
of the paper. Its penultimate part will then address some of the remedi-
al action that has been taken to address delays in the CW destruction
schedule. The paper will conclude with a summary of the argument and
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an attempt to draw some lessons for the still outstanding task of com-
pletely eliminating chemical weapons.
1. Verification on Paper – CWC Provisions on Disarmament and Its
Verification
The destruction of all chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles as well as CW
production facilities are among the key obligations contained in the
CWC. They are mandated by Article I, paragraph 2 and paragraph 4,
respectively. In order to allow for the verification of these destruction
activities, Article III, paragraph 1 (a) of the CWC requires CW possessor
States inter alia to declare their CW stockpiles and provide a general plan
for destruction. Similar provisions apply to CW production facilities.
Articles IV and V, together with Parts IV (a) and V of the Verification
Annex, deal systematically with the rules applying to and procedures to
be followed by States Parties possessing either CW or CW production
facilities (CWPF). Chemical weapons stockpiles must be destroyed and
CWPF must be either destroyed or converted for activities not prohib-
ited under the Convention. Importantly, Articles IV and V provide for
on-site inspection and monitoring of all locations at which chemical
weapons are stored or destroyed. This provision mandates the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to be
present whenever and wherever chemical weapons are being destroyed.
Furthermore, the movement and storage of chemical weapons cannot
be undertaken without informing the OPCW.
According to Article IV, paragraph 6, CW must be destroyed within 10
years of the entry into force (EIF) of the Convention – by 29 April 2007
– and this destruction must begin within two years of the Convention
entering into force for a given state party. Destruction or conversion
activities at CW production facilities must begin within one year of the
Convention entering into force for a State Party, and be completed
within 10 years. On the way towards the total destruction of all CW
holdings, intermediate destruction targets are established in Part IV (a),
paragraph 17 of the Verification Annex to be achieved three, five and
seven years after the CWC’s EIF. In the event that a State Party is unable
to meet either any of the intermediate destruction deadlines or the 10-
year deadline for complete CW destruction, the Verification Annex in
Part IV (a), paragraphs 20 to 23 and 24 to 28, respectively, spells out the
procedures to be followed for deciding on an extension of the original
CW destruction deadlines. In case of complete CW destruction a max-
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imum extension of up to five years – until April 2012 – can be granted
by the Conference of States Parties (CSP) of the OPCW.
Lastly, Article IV, paragraph 16, and Article V, paragraph 19, stipulate
that the cost of destruction of both CW and CW production facilities,
as well as monitoring and inspection must be met by the CW possessor
State itself. This is accomplished in part by reimbursing the OPCW for
the costs incurred during on-site monitoring and inspections.
2. CW Destruction and Its Verification in Practice
2.1 Teething Problems: Just What is an Inspector’s Salary …
The exact meaning of this latter provision of the Verification Annex was
contested during the initial phase of CWC implementation. The bone
of contention was the question what exactly constitutes an inspector’s
salary. Notwithstanding a provisional compromise found during the first
CSP in May 1997 in the absence of the Russian Federation, the debate
on the reimbursable part of an inspector’s salary was kept alive during
the inter-sessional period.1 In order to overcome the impasse during the
second session of the Conference, a temporary solution for the 1998
OPCW budget was negotiated, leaving an ever wider margin for
Member States’ interpretations.2
What became increasingly clear during these debates was the desire of
the big CW possessor States to keep the reimbursable part of verifica-
tion costs for the destruction of CW and CW production facilities as
small as possible. Thus, after the second session of the CSP there was
considerable concern that the wording agreed to might allow an inter-
pretation by the Russian government that inspectors’ salaries do not
have to be reimbursed and only the “operational” verification cost would
have to be covered. This Russian approach to cost of verification was
fully consistent with a distinction introduced by the then Soviet repre-
sentative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) during the negotia-
1 See the decision of the First Session of the Conference of State Parties contained in
Decision. Programme and Budget and Working Capital Fund, document C-I/DEC.73, The
Hague, 23 May 1997.
2 See the decision of the Second Session of the Conference of State Parties contained in
Decision. Programme and Budget for 1998 and Working Capital Fund, document C-II/DEC.17,
The Hague, 5 December 1997.
tion of the CWC. In a statement, the budget of the future organisation
was divided into two categories: administrative expenses which cover
personnel, administrative activities, meetings, and the like; and opera-
tional expenses which, on the contrary, are those “expenses required for
systematic international verification on the territory of that State party”.3
According to the compromise that was eventually reached during the
ninth meeting of the Executive Council “a daily salary will be calculat-
ed by dividing an annual base salary by 365 days”; in competing calcu-
lation schemes it was proposed to divide the annual base salary by
smaller numbers of actual working days or even working days minus
vacation periods and the like. Yet, since these alternative models for cal-
culating the daily salary of an inspector would have resulted in higher
figures for reimbursement to the Organisation, they proved unaccept-
able to the larger CW possessor States. In a similar vein, the Executive
Council recommended to the Third Session of the CSP “to include
reimbursement for the involvement of members of an inspection team
in inspection planning before and inspection report generation after an
inspection.”4 According to the compromise finally worked out, for CW
storage and production facilities the inspected States Parties will have to
reimburse 10 inspector-days in addition to the duration of the inspec-
tion and 8 inspector-days for CW destruction facilities. Furthermore, the
Council recommended that the CSP task the Technical Secretariat with
applying and developing further cost-saving methods in its verification
activities under Articles IV and V.5
In sum, these debates surrounding the organisation’s income, with par-
ticular reference to cost of verification under Articles IV and V of the
Convention occupied much of the first three Sessions of the
Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council and a facilitator in
between these CSP sessions. The fact that CW possessor States – from
the point of view of other member states – were on the verge of violat-
ing the “possessor pays” principle enshrined in the Convention in rela-
tion to the cost of verification for CW destruction related activities did
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3 See the plenary statement of the Soviet representative Nazarkin, reprinted in Document
CD/PV.473, Geneva, 11 August 1988, pp.8-12; quote on p.10, emphasis added.
4 See the decision of the Executive Council as contained in Document EC-XI/DEC.1 of 4
September 1998.
5 See the decision of the Third Session of the Conference of State Parties contained in
Decision. Cost of Verification Under Articles IV and V, document C-III/DEC.8, The Hague, 17
November 1998.
From Paper to Reality: Verification and Cost Issues
71
not deter both the United States and Russia from attempting to keep
the reimbursable part of verification costs as small as possible. The less
CW possessor States were willing to pay for verification of their CW-
related storage and destruction activities, the bigger the portion of these
costs to be covered by all States Parties through the Organisation’s reg-
ular budget. With the benefit of hindsight and in relation to the overall
effort required to destroy CW stockpiles, the figures being discussed in
this context are almost negligible.
2.2 Continued Challenges: Growing Numbers, Slipping Deadlines
Initially four States Parties – India, Russia, the United States and A
State Party (according to OPCW jargon)– declared the possession of
CW stockpiles, which were stored at 33 locations in the four coun-
tries.6 These countries have declared a total of nearly 70,000 metric
tons of chemical agents and about 8.6 million munitions and contain-
ers.7 Of these 70,000 tons, the Russian Federation owns some 40,000
metric tonnes, the US 28,575 metric tons, India around 1,000 metric
tons and A State Party around 600 metric tons. In 2003, the number
of CW possessor States increased to 5 when Albania declared in April
of that year that it had discovered some 16 tons of CW agents on its
territory. In early 2004, Libya acceded to the CWC and became the
6th CW possessor State when it declared possession of 23.62 tons of
CW agents.8 Due to the late discovery of CW stocks in Albania and
the late accession of Libya to the CWC, both states had to apply for
an extension of the intermediate destruction deadlines as stipulated
in the Verification Annex to the CWC. The decisions to extend in
principle the phase 1, 2, and 3 destruction deadlines were taken by
the Conference of States Parties at its Ninth Session in
November/December 2004.9
6 OPCW, Annual Report 1999, July 2000, p. 20.
7 Mills, ““Progress in theThe Hague: Quarterly Review no. 35,”” p. 13.
8 See John Hart and Shannon N. Kile, ‘Libya’s renunciation of nuclear, biological and chem-
ical weapons and ballistic missiles’ in SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.629-648.
9 See Decision. Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Extension of the Intermediate
Deadlines for the Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, document C-
9/DEC.7, The Hague, 30 November 2004; Decision. Request by Albania for Extensions of the
Intermediate Deadlines for the Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, doc-
ument C-9/DEC.8, The Hague, 30 November 2004.
Already well before these requests had to be dealt with, because of a
delay in commencing the CW destruction process, the Russian
Federation was unable to meet the first intermediate deadline for
destroying one percent of its highest-risk (Category 1) chemical
weapons stocks three years after the CWC’s EIF.10 In November 1999,
as permitted under the Convention, Russia asked the Executive
Council to extend the intermediate destruction deadline.11 The
Russian Federation argued that although the construction of CW
destruction facilities had been impeded by economic difficulties, it
intended to meet the next intermediate destruction deadline on 29
April 2002, when 20 percent of the Category 1 chemical weapons had
to be destroyed.12 The Conference of States Parties, in addition to
retaining the 10-year deadline for destruction of the entire stockpile,
requested the Russian Federation to submit a revised destruction plan
as early as possible. Moscow fulfilled this request in October 2000.13
In 2001, the Russian government re-assessed its plan for the destruc-
tion of its chemical weapons stockpiles. The plan approved by the
Russian government in July 2001 included significant changes, intend-
ed in part to comply with conditions set down by the U.S. Congress for
the reinstatement of U.S. contributions to the Russian destruction pro-
gramme. In addition, the plan expected completion of the destruction
effort in 2012. The new plan was formally presented to the OPCW
Executive Council in September 2001, and, in November, Russia sub-
mitted the required request for an extension of both the intermediate
and final deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical
weapons. Under the plan, 1 percent will be destroyed by 2003, 20 per-
cent by 2007, 45 percent by 2009, and 100 percent by 2012. The
request for the extension of the 1 percent deadline was approved by
the Conference of States Parties at its 7th Session in November 2002,
as was in principle the extension of the 20 percent intermediate dead-
line.14 The revised phase 2 deadline was set for 29 April 2007 by the
subsequent 8th Session of the Conference of States Parties, which also
Alexander Kelle
72
10 The intermediate deadline is specified in paragraph 17 of Part IV (A) of the Verification
Annex to the CWC, Document C—V/DEC/CRP.12, May 2, 2000.
11 According to paragraph 22 of Part IV (A). See Document C—V/3, p. 11.
12 CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 46, December 1999, p. 13.
13 Mills, ““Progress in The Hague: Quarterly Review no. 32,”” p. 9.
14 See Decision. Request of the Russian Federation for an Extension of the Intermediate and Final
Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-7/DEC.19, The
Hague, 11 October 2002.
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agreed in principle to extend the 45 and 100 percent deadlines for
destruction of the Russian CW stockpiles.15 The date for the destruc-
tion of 45 percent of Russian CW stockpiles was set by the 11th Session
of the Conference of States Parties for 31 December 2009.16
It had become clear in the meantime that not only the Russian Federation,
but also most other CW possessor States would not be able to meet the
April 2007 deadline for the complete destruction of their CW stockpiles.
According to one estimate, in late 2006 the US had destroyed somewhat
in excess of 40 percent of its Category 1 CW, India around 70 percent, A
State Party (according to OPCW jargon) more than 80 percent, and the
Russian Federation around 16 percent.This last figure is somewhat contro-
versial in so far as it relies on an accounting point at the end of the first
phase of the destruction process – which is the way Russian authorities
prefer to account for their progress in CW destruction – and not at the end
of the whole procedure – which would be in line with existing facility
agreements. However, there seems to be a consensus emerging that the
Russian way of accounting for progress in CW destruction is acceptable, as
this is likely to allow Russia to meet the interim deadline for the destruc-
tion of 20 percent of its category 1 CW on 29 April 2007. It also seems
that the Russian willingness to accept verification measures for phase 2
destruction activities has been conducive to reaching this consensus.
Delays have required the extension of the final destruction deadline for
practically all CW possessor States. The extensions granted have set the
new dates for all CW stockpiles to be destroyed to: in the case of India,
28 April 200917, of A State Party 31 December 200818, and of the
Russian Federation and the US, the latest possible date allowed under
the CWC, that is 29 April 2012.19
15 See Decision. Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction by the
Russian Federation of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-8/DEC.13, The Hague,
24 October 2003.
16 See Decision. Proposal for a Date for the Completion of Phase 3 of the Destruction by the
Russian Federation of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-11/DEC.14, The Hague,
8 December 2006.
17 See Decision. Request by India for an Extension of the Deadline for Destroying all of its
Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-11/DEC.16, The Hague, 8 December 2006.
18 See Decision. Request by a State Party for an Extension of the Final Deadline for Destroying all
of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-11/DEC.12, The Hague, 8 December 2006.
19 See Decision. Request by the United States of America for Establishment of a Revised Date for
the Final Deadline for Destroying all of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-
11/DEC.17, and Decision. Proposal by the Russian Federation on Setting of a Specific Date for
Completion of Destruction of its Stockpiles of Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-
11/DEC.18, The Hague, 8 December 2006.
Destruction in Libya has not even begun, thus a similar decision for
Libya has set the deadline for completion of destruction of its CW
arsenal at 31 December 2010. This decision of the Conference also
specifies the intermediate deadlines for Libyan CW destruction for
earlier in 2010.20 Practically all of these decisions require the CW pos-
sessor states to report every 90 days on the progress made in the
destruction process, as well as the continued submission of annual
plans of destruction and annual reports on the destruction activities
on their territories.
In the case of Albania, which in spring of 2007 had destroyed almost 40
percent of its Category 1 CW stockpiles, no extension request was put
forward before the deadline stipulated in the CWC, i.e. one year before
the target for destruction.
Completion of the Albanian destruction process is expected sometime
in May or June 2007. However, Albania has been found to be in techni-
cal non-compliance and was tasked by the Executive Council at its 48th
session in March to redress the situation and report back to the Council
meeting at the end of June 2007.
3. Addressing Challenges of Verification and Cost Issues Related to
CW Destruction
In addition to the CW destruction activities to be undertaken by CW
possessor States and the verification activities to be conducted by the
OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council has been tasked
by the Conference of States Parties at its 11th Session in December
2006 to conduct additional visits in two of the CW possessor States, i.e.
the Russian Federation and the United States. In addition, a number of
financial support measures have been undertaken by several CWC
States Parties in the framework of the so-called G8 Global Partnership.
The first of these two sets of activities will be briefly discussed in the
following section.
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Specific Dates for Intermediate Destruction Deadlines, and its Request for an Extension of the
Final Deadline for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, document C-
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3.1 Executive Council Activities 2008 – 2012
It is noteworthy that the decision taken by the 11th Session of the
Conference of States Parties to conduct visits by representatives of the
Executive Council to CW destruction facilities in Russia and the US,
or the construction sites of such destruction facilities, heavily empha-
sizes the obligation of those two CWC States Parties to complete the
destruction of their Category 1 CW stockpiles by 29 April 2012 at the
latest. This follows similar reminders contained in the abovemen-
tioned decisions to extend the final destruction deadline for the US
and Russia to the said date and has to be seen in the context of 1)
statements by former high-ranking members of the US government,
according to which the destruction of US CW stocks might only be
two-thirds accomplished by 2012 and take several more years to be
completed,21 and; 2) the fact that the construction of some of the
Russian CW destruction facilities is not making the progress that
would be required to meet the 2012 deadline. In line with this assess-
ment, the decision stresses the “need for States Parties to take meas-
ures to overcome the problems in their chemical weapons destruction
programmes”.22
It also has to be emphasized that these visits are not part of the regular
verification system applied by the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat. On
the contrary, the decision document points out that these “visits to con-
sider progress and efforts to meet an extended deadline established in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention” are intended as an
“additional transparency and confidence building measure”.23 It is on
the basis of such an understanding that the US and the Russian
Federation are offering to host such visits beginning in 2008 with a view
to having “each relevant facility … visited at least once during the exten-
sion period.” The details of the visits are to be worked out between the
Chair of the Executive Council and the State Party concerned, visits are
to be carried out in a way that they do not disrupt the destruction activ-
ities or their preparations and should “include discussions with senior
representatives of relevant government authorities as identified by the
21 See for example the letter by former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quoted
in “Rumsfeld: U.S. will miss chemical weapons disposal deadline”, in Army Times, 13 April 2006.
22 Decision. Visits by Representatives of the Executive Council, document C-11/DEC.20,
The Hague, 8 December 2006, p.1.
23 Ibid., p.2
State party hosting the visit”.24 The decision by the Conference of
States Parties furthermore specifies the composition of the visiting
group, requests the drafting of a factual report on each visit – on which
the State Party hosting the visit is allowed to comment – and addresses
the financial implications of the visits.
In sum, this decision sets out to accomplish three goals. First, it serves
as an additional reminder to the US and the Russian Federation of their
obligation under the Convention to completely destroy their Category
1 CW stockpiles by 29 April 2012. Second, it allows the OPCW’s
Executive Council to closely monitor the progress made by these two
States in their destruction efforts and thereby to ascertain that all pos-
sible efforts are being undertaken to meet the extended deadline. Third,
this could provide the basis for a way out of the dilemma the OPCW
will find itself in, should one or both of the States Parties of concern be
unable to meet the extended CW destruction deadline in 2012. In such
a scenario, and if the remaining time needed to complete the destruc-
tion process is measurable in months, not years, this decision and the
resulting visiting process might serve as the basis for the argument that
both the US and Russia have undertaken everything possible to meet
the destruction deadline – confirmed by the visits – but due to factors
beyond their control have been unable to achieve the goal. In such a sce-
nario, the State(s) of concern might be found to be in technical non-
compliance with the provisions of the CWC and tasked to redress the
situation as quickly as possible. It needs to be emphasised, though, that
this scenario is something that most, if not all CWC States Parties would
like to avoid. This is why the monitoring arrangement was drawn up by
the Executive Council in the first place.
Conclusion
The CWC goes into some detail in spelling out the provisions for the
destruction of chemical weapons and CW destruction facilities. As the
historical flashback in relation to reimbursement of inspectors’ salaries
has shown, the early phase of CWC implementation was dominated by
attempts to stick as closely to the letter of the CWC as possible and in
particular to ensure that the “possessor pays” principle was not violated.
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Since then, CWC states parties’ understanding of the magnitude of the
problem of ridding the world of chemical weapons has come a long way.
Over the same period of time, the willingness to support CW possessor
States who face difficulties in living up to their obligations under the
CWC’s disarmament provisions has seen a corresponding growth, as
evidenced by many bilateral agreements in support of CW destruction
activities most notably in the Russian Federation, but also through the
concerted efforts of the G-8 Global Partnership.
Within the framework of the OPCW’s activities, there is clear evidence
that the bureaucratic and procedural machinery that has been put in
place by the CWC to deal with missed intermediate and final destruc-
tion deadlines is working. However, there is also clear evidence of a cer-
tain amount of flexibility and creativity in dealing with the prospect that
the two big possessor States, the US and the Russian Federation, might
not meet the extended final destruction deadline of 29 April 2012. In
order to ensure that these two States Parties expend every effort to
achieve complete destruction by the newly set target date, the OPCW’s
Executive Council will remain seized of the matter and thereby hopeful-
ly ensure that this issue will receive sufficient attention by political elites
in Washington and Moscow. For the wider community of CWC States
Parties, it is imperative to maintain the commitment to supporting CW
destruction activities – most notably in Russia – at a high level and to live
up to commitments undertaken in the G-8 Global Partnership and bilat-
eral contexts. Long gone are the days when the question of inspector
salaries could lead to frictions among CWC States Parties. Every effort
has to be made to ensure that the process of CW destruction and its ver-
ification picks up speed and runs more smoothly between now and 2012.
Only in this way can the crucial assessment of the success of CW
destruction in less than five years from now be positive.
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The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their
Destruction (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, is one of the – if
not the – most advanced, mature and successful of international disarma-
ment treaties.1 Ten years after its entry into force, 182 States are parties
to the Convention and of the remaining 13 States, 6 have signed it.
Nevertheless, the problems of the CWC’s universality and the adherence
of Middle Eastern States to it are among the hottest issues regarding the
implementation of the Convention. Before turning to the challenges and
problems related to the delays in the destruction of CW arsenals, men-
tion must be made (not only because we are celebrating the 10th anniver-
sary of the CWC, but also to strike the right balance), if only briefly, of
some of the achievements, which are indeed quite impressive.
According to the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons), 100 percent of the declared chemical weapons production
facilities have been inactivated (this, of course, does not mean that there
may not be undeclared facilities or sites). These declared facilities are
all, as the OPCW says, subject to a verification regime of unprecedent-
ed stringency. One hundred percent of the declared chemical weapon
stockpiles have been inventoried and verified. Almost 90 percent (58 of
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1 Kim Howells, Minister of State, FCO, stated in March 2007: ‘In my view, the convention is
one of the most successful disarmament treaties in force today’ (10th Anniversary Seminar
on the Chemical Weapons Convention 26 March, FCO).
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the 65) chemical weapons production facilities declared to the
Organisation by 12 States Parties, have been either destroyed or con-
verted for peaceful purposes. Over 30 percent of the 8.6 million chem-
ical munitions and containers covered by the Convention have also been
verifiably destroyed. Almost one quarter of the world’s declared stock-
piles of approximately 71,000 metric tonnes of chemical agents have
been verifiably destroyed.2
Yet, notwithstanding these and other achievements (e.g., the adoption
of national laws and programmes in accordance with the Convention’s
requirements, the number of inspections carried out by the OPCW,
etc), the CWC now faces several challenges.
The CWC has, in principle, two main pillars – the disarmament or
destruction pillar, under which States party to the Convention have to
declare and destroy their CW, and the non-proliferation pillar that is
meant to prevent the emergence of new weapons. These pillars are
under a single roof, which is the verification carried out by the OPCW.
They are also interlinked by this common roof. If one pillar (say, the dis-
armament one) faces problems and therefore calls for more attention
and resources, this means that the other pillar (the non-proliferation
one) receives less attention and also fewer of the always limited
resources. As the report by Vertic, a British verification NGO, remarked,
‘not only are existing chemical weapons stockpiles being destroyed at a
much slower rate than required by the treaty, but verification has been
skewed towards monitoring this process. This has been at the expense
of verifying that illicit production of new chemical weapons is not
occurring, including in the chemical industry’.3
The CWC member states must declare chemical weapons stockpiles
and production facilities, relevant chemical industry facilities, and other
related information such as chemical exports and imports. According to
the Convention, Member States that possess CW and production facil-
ities were to destroy them by April 2007. There are six States Parties to
the CWC – Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation, the United
States and A State Party (according to OPCW jargon) – that have
declared their CW stockpiles. They are considered to be possessor
States. However, unlike the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), the CWC does not have different categories of States Parties.
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Failure to Respect the Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline
The CWC is a non-discriminatory disarmament treaty and this is one of
its important strengths.
In addition, 12 Parties declared a total of 65 former chemical weapons
production facilities, all of which were to be dismantled or converted to
peaceful purposes. States Parties that have declared Chemical Weapons
Production Facilities (CWPFs) include Bosnia and Herzegovina, China,
France, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, Serbia,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and A State Party. Of the 65
declared CWPFs, 58 have been certified as destroyed or converted for
peaceful purposes.
During the negotiation of the CWC, it was clear that most of the chem-
ical weapons to be destroyed would be the Cold War stockpiles of the
United States and the former Soviet Union. Indeed, US and Russian
stockpiles make up the bulk of the weapons now being destroyed, but
other members have also declared chemical weapons holdings. In 2003,
for example, Libya confirmed its intention to give up its Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) and join the OPCW, disclosing to the British
and US governments the quantities of chemical agents and bombs
designed to be filled with chemical agents. These weapons are now being
destroyed and their destruction verified under the terms of the CWC.
Although the US has now destroyed over 40 percent of its stockpile,
and Russia started in 2006 to make significant progress towards destroy-
ing 20 percent of its CW arsenal, both face major challenges to meet the
2012 final deadline. Many states are working with the Russian govern-
ment to help destroy weapons at seven Russian destruction sites. In
September 2006, Russia opened its third major facility for the destruc-
tion of its CW stockpiles near Maradikovsky in the Kirov Region (300
miles northeast of Moscow), the first to destroy nerve agents. At the
time, Paul Walker, Legacy Program Director at Global Green USA, com-
mented: “Global Green USA congratulates the Russian Federation on
destroying over 2,200 tons of deadly chemical agents over the past four
years. The start-up of a third destruction facility this month will now
help Russia to accelerate their CW stockpile destruction and potential-
ly meet the April 2007 deadline of the Chemical Weapons Convention
for 20 percent stockpile elimination. However, deadlines must not
trump safety and protection of public health, and we urge Russia to be
extremely cautious as they move forward with this dangerous process.”4
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On 8 December 2006, the Conference of State Parties granted exten-
sions for practically all states that had requested extensions (including
all the possessor states).
The Conference 
- extended the deadline for A State Party to 31 December 2008;
- set 31 December 2009 as the date for completion of the destruction
by the Russian Federation of 45 percent of its Category 1 chemical
weapons stockpiles, and 29 April 2012 as the date for completion of
the destruction of 100 percent of its chemical weapons stockpiles;
- established for Libya the following dates as intermediate deadlines for
the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles: phase 1
(1 percent), to be completed by 1 May 2010, phase 2 (20 percent), to
be completed by 1 July 2010, and phase 3 (45 percent), to be com-
pleted by 1 November 2010;5 the Conference also called upon Libya
to complete destruction of its Category 2 chemical weapons as soon as
possible, but in any case no later than 31 December 2011;
- granted an extension of the deadline by which India must destroy all
of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpiles, subject to several con-
ditions, including that India complete destruction of its Category 1
chemical weapons no later than 28 April 2009;
- established 29 April 2012 as the date by which the United States must
destroy all of its Category 1 chemical weapons, subject to certain con-
ditions;
- granted Albania extensions of the phase 1, 2, and 3 intermediate dead-
lines for destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons, and estab-
lished the following new deadlines: phase 1 (1 percent), to be com-
pleted by 15 January 2007; phase 2 (20 percent), to be completed by
31 January 2007; and phase 3 (45 percent), to be completed by 28
February 2007.
What are the reasons for delays? 
Insufficient financing has caused delays with the Russian CW destruc-
tion programme, especially at the earlier stages of its implementation.
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To a large extent, they were related to the 1998 financial crises in
Russia. As the title of an article by two Russian experts, ‘It is cheaper to
produce than to destroy’,6 indicates, destruction of CW stockpiles, espe-
cially destruction which is environmentally safe, verifiable and without
delays (all interrelated and important conditions), is indeed a very
expensive business. The country has redesigned its chemical weapons
destruction programme in the hope of destroying its entire 40,000 met-
ric ton stockpile by April 2012. By April 2006, however, it had
destroyed less than three percent. Nevertheless, on 24 April 2007,
General Victor Kholostov, the Deputy Director of the Federal Agency
on Industry, announced that the Russian Federation had completed the
second phase of the destruction programme by destroying more than 20
percent of its chemical weapons stockpiles.7
Russian officials have said they will need international financial assis-
tance to meet their goal of total destruction by April 2012. Yet, even
with international aid, it is unclear whether Russia will be able to
destroy its stockpiles by the 2012 deadline.
Washington also faces its share of setbacks, including financial con-
straints, political resistance, as well as technical challenges. Like Russia,
the United States seems unlikely to meet the new extended deadline.
One of the most pessimistic estimates is that the United States will be
not be able to get rid of its CW arsenal, which still totals some 28,000
metric tons, until 2023. To date, destruction has been completed at only
two of seven storage depots. Efforts to destroy chemical weapon stock-
piles have been stymied by technical problems, such as unanticipated
heavy-metal contamination and fires at destruction sites. Political resist-
ance at the state and local level has also slowed progress, with local com-
munities raising concerns about health and safety. Finally, limited fund-
ing has contributed to slowing down destruction at US Army CW dis-
posal sites in Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky.
One of the negative consequences of delays in the destruction of exist-
ing CW arsenals is that other elements of the CWC, such as verifying
that new weapons are not produced or new facilities opened, have
received less attention and resources. Delays in the destruction of CW
stockpiles also increase the danger that terrorists may get hold of some
of the most deadly weapons that exist today. Recent developments in
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7 OPCW, Press Release, 24 April, 2007.
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several parts of the world show that terrorists of different kinds active-
ly seek and would not hesitate to use chemical weapons, at least until
nuclear weapons become available to them. Finally, delays in destruc-
tion of CW could increase threats to the environment, although it has
to be acknowledged that environmental concerns are precisely one of
the factors causing at least some of the delays. In this respect too, the
two pillars of the CWC are interlinked.Though environmental concerns
are causing some delays in destruction of CW, they are deemed more
important than deadlines. While meeting deadlines is important, safety
– both human and environmental – has to prevail.
So, what line should be taken concerning deadlines and the potential
need to consider further extensions? It is of interest to note that OPCW
officials as well as State representatives stick firmly to the 2012 dead-
line and refuse to comment on possible extensions beyond that date –
extensions which, unlike those of December 2006, would go beyond
the Convention clauses. However, independent experts are expressing
serious doubts about the Russian Federation and the United States
being able to meet the 2012 deadline. This is probably a wise division
of labour. While States and the OPCW have to do their utmost to try to
meet the extended deadlines and continuing to reiterate the finality of
2012 deadlines is meant to induce them to work harder, it is also neces-
sary to think the unthinkable and this is better done by individual
experts.
When the text of the CWC was negotiated and then adopted in 1993,
the States Parties already envisaged that there could be difficulties in
meeting the deadlines established by the Convention. Therefore, in the
Annex on Implementation and Verification (Verification Annex, Part
IV) they provided that ‘if a State Party, due to exceptional circum-
stances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of
destruction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the order of
destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may propose changes in
those levels’ (para. 21) and that ‘if a State Party believes that it will be
unable to ensure the destruction of all Category 1 chemical weapons
not later than 10 years after the entry into force this Convention, it may
submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the dead-
line for completing the destruction of such chemical weapons’ (para.
24). Notwithstanding these escape clauses, it is clear today that the ini-
tial deadlines for the destruction of the CW arsenals of all States that
possessed them and especially the two biggest possessor States – the
Russian Federation and the United States – foreseen for the 1990s, were
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unrealistic and that expectations were too high.
Should the Conference of States Parties or individual States Parties take
any measures against those who do not keep these new extended dead-
lines? This is as much a legal as it is a political question. Article XII of
the CWC provides for measures to ensure compliance, including sanc-
tions. In cases of serious damage to the object and purpose of the
Convention or in cases of particularly serious breaches of the
Convention, the Conference of States Parties may bring the issue to the
attention of the UN General Assembly or the Security Council.
Under international law, measures or sanctions should depend on the
nature of non-compliance, i.e. the principle of proportionality applies
(even Chapter VII sanctions cannot be completely ruled out should the
Security Council find that non-compliance constitutes a threat to inter-
national peace and security). However, such extreme measures are hard-
ly practicable in cases of a State missing deadlines, even if this were due
to the fact that it did not make sufficient efforts to meet the deadline.
Something else has to be present, e.g., dolus malus, hiding and keeping
parts of one’s chemical arsenal.
Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical weapons have a stigma: it is difficult
to imagine a Sstate, whether a part of what we call the “axis of evil” or
a pariah state, which would proudly declare its chemical weapons pro-
gramme. Such a general revulsion towards CW, considered a poisonous,
treacherous means of warfare, means that the implementation of the
CWC, including the non-observance of destruction deadlines, especial-
ly if such non-observance is due to a lack of political will, is dependent
on the transparency of the process of implementation of the CWC. This
means that one has to resort to the force of public opinion to move
towards a chemical weapons-free world. Cooperation and engagement
are more effective means of achieving the objectives of the Convention
than sanctions. This may be true in many areas of international law and
politics, but it is particularly true in creating a CW-free world.
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Introduction
The classical definition of customary international law, as phrased in
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, is
“general practice accepted as law”.1 The customary layer of international
law is of immense significance. It has the disadvantage of constituting jus
non scriptum (incrementally consolidating in the general conduct of
States, and often hard to pin down), but this is balanced by the advan-
tage of general custom being binding universally on all States (even those
States that did not take part in the process leading to the creation of the
general custom). By contrast, treaties (e.g., the CWC or the NPT) have
the advantage of constituting jus scriptum (which makes them readily
available), but this is balanced by the disadvantage of each treaty being
legally binding solely on Contracting Parties. The only treaties that are at
this juncture truly universal (meaning that all States – bar none – have
become Contracting Parties to them) are the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. Other treaties (like the
CWC or the NPT) are close to universality, but close is not good enough.
Even a single hold-out State, resolutely remaining a non-Contracting
Party to a treaty, may regard the instrument as res inter alios acta.
7. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE PROHIBITION OF USE OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (Annexed to Charter of the United Nations),
1945, 9 International Legislation 510, 522 (M.O. Hudson ed., 1950).
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In this paper, the standing in customary international law of the three
categories of weapons of mass destruction shall be examined seriatim:
nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. The focus
on these weapons will not be from the angle of disarmament but
through the different (albeit related) lens of the jus in bello.
1. Nuclear Weapons
a) There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons are subject to the appli-
cation of the general principles of the jus in bello (the laws of armed con-
flict, often called international humanitarian law). As the International
Court of Justice pronounced in the 1996 Advisory Opinion on Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: “In the view of the vast majority of
States as well as writers, there can be no doubt as to the applicability of
humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The Court shares that view”.2
b) Unlike the other two sub-sets of weapons of mass destruction (chem-
ical and biological weapons), nuclear weapons are not subject to any
comprehensive treaty forbidding their use. Absent a treaty, the question
is whether there is general customary international law to that effect.
But a word of caution is required here: weapon bans are not necessari-
ly similar to other subject matters. Despite the existence of some rele-
vant customary principles, the undeniable fact is that, whenever States
wish to exclude from use a specific weapon, they do not rely on overar-
ching customary principles alone, but conclude a treaty proscribing that
weapon in concrete and explicit terms. When there is no specific treaty
ban of a particular weapon, one can argue the matter back and forth in
light of customary international law, but there will always be those who
would challenge the legal applicability of the general principles to the
concrete weapon.
c) The two cardinal principles of the jus in bello that are germane to the
legality of nuclear weapons are (i) the principle of distinction in the
conduct of hostilities between combatants and civilians, and (ii) the
principle that belligerent States must avoid employing weapons that
cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to combatants.3 On
the face of it, the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons are such
2 Advisory Opinion on Legality of  the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Reports
226, 259.
3 On these two principles, see Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of
International Armed Conflict  57-59, 82 (2004).
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that they seem plainly irreconcilable with either principle. If we take the
two instances of the actual use of A-bombs during hostilities
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945), it is easy to see why the two
principles appear to collide head-on with the detonation of nuclear
weapons. First, although there were identifiable military objectives in
both target cities (in the form of substantial military units, dock facili-
ties, etc.), the number of civilian casualties was excessive compared to
the military advantage that could be expected to be gained, certainly
transcending what may be reasonably looked upon as mere “collateral
damage”. Secondly, the long-term radiation effects of the two bombs
caused unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury in a most blatant
fashion (many victims died of one form of cancer or another many years
after the termination of World War II).
Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind in connection with the latter prob-
lem that the contemporary nuclear arsenal (as distinct from the relative-
ly primitive A-bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) includes “clean”
bombs which apparently avoid the more egregious consequences of
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. As for the former issue, it is
necessary to take into account the present availability of smaller, low-
yield, tactical nuclear devices, the effects of which are limited spatially,
so that civilians are not likely to be exposed in large numbers to alarm-
ing risks. As well, one can visualize the use of nuclear weapons (whether
small or even full-size) in circumstances where civilians are simply not
physically within range. This can transpire, by way of illustration, either
when an enemy fleet is engaged in the middle of the ocean or in the
course of desert warfare (epitomized by the North African campaigns of
World War II). It follows that the use of “clean” nuclear devices in hostil-
ities, waged in areas remote from civilian concentrations, would not be in
non-compliance with the general principles of the customary jus in bello.
d) The fact that nuclear weapons have actually remained on the shelf
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki by no means suggests that the employ-
ment of these weapons in wartime is now forbidden by customary inter-
national law. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the majority of
the International Court Justices rejected the allegation that non-recourse
to nuclear weapons over the previous half-century constitutes proof that
their use has become unlawful pursuant to customary international law.4
e) The main argument, perhaps, against the contention that nuclear
4 Ibid., 254.
weapons are currently unlawful is a sort of argumentum a contrario. It is
impossible to gloss over the multilateral treaties in force that not only
prohibit testing, exploding, emplacing or installing nuclear weapons in
designated areas (such as Antarctica, outer space or the ocean floor), but
even establish nuclear free zones (e.g., in Latin America) within the
bounds of which nuclear weapons are not allowed to be used. What is
the point in concluding a treaty that expressly excludes the use of
nuclear weapons inside a well-defined zone if recourse to such weapons
is banned globally? The entire rationale underlying such a treaty is the
built-in assumption that – outside the nuclear free zone – there is a pal-
pable chance that nuclear weapons will actually be employed.
f) The International Court of Justice, in 1996, by eleven votes to three,
pronounced: “There is in neither customary nor conventional interna-
tional law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as such”.5
By the barest of majorities (seven to seven, a tie resolved by the
President’s casting a vote), the Court added that – although generally
contrary to the rules of the jus in bello – the use of nuclear weapons may
be lawful “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake”.6 The last sentence is most trou-
blesome. It appears to be utterly inconsistent with the basic tenet that
the jus in bello applies equally to all belligerent States, irrespective of the
merits of their cause in accordance with the jus ad bellum.7 The notion
that, because of some extreme circumstances of self-defence in which
its survival is at stake, a State can resort to desperate measures that oth-
erwise would be unlawful, is most disturbing. What about a non-nuclear
State, like Italy? Can Italy claim that, in an extreme case of self-defence
when its survival is at stake, it is allowed to use, say, chemical weapons?
If not, why – and on what ground – are nuclear Powers granted some
preferential treatment as an exceptional privileges not available to any-
body else? In the author’s opinion, these are rhetorical questions. The
Court’s language is ill-advised and legally wrong. However, irrespective
of this peculiar twist in the Advisory Opinion (which is totally redun-
dant), the author shares the overall conclusion – shared, as indicated, by
a lopsided majority – that there is no (customary or treaty) direct pro-
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7 See Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 161-162 (4th ed., 2005).
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hibition of the use of nuclear weapons in present-day international law.
g) The issue of the legality of nuclear weapons must not be confused
with the NPT regime, predicated on the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.8 The presupposition of the treaty framers was – and
still is9 – that non-proliferation can diminish the chance of use. There is
a tendency to criticize the NPT regime. But, while remaining fully cog-
nizant of the “half-empty glass”, we should not overlook the “half-full
glass”. First off, although the discriminatory treatment of “have” States
and “have-not” States is hard to justify (based, as it is, on the “have”
States telling the “have-not” States: “do as we say and not as we do”), one
cannot ignore the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, there has
been a significant reduction in the nuclear stockpiles of the “have” States
(in line with the long-neglected undertaking contained in Article VI of
the NPT10). Secondly, non-proliferation has been a greater success than
anticipated four decades ago. Surely, circa 1968, nobody seriously dared
to hope that only two additional countries (India and Pakistan) would
have actually joined the nuclear club. Thirdly, as a counterweight to the
two additions, it is noteworthy  that the trend has not been unidirec-
tional. Some countries possessing nuclear weapons (the Ukraine,
Belarus, Kazakhstan and South Africa) have relinquished them, and
some other countries (pre-eminently Libya) – once bent on going
nuclear – have dropped out of the race.
There is at present the dual problem of North Korea and Iran. But with
North Korea there seems to be reason for some guarded optimism that
it will soon forego its nuclearisation. The situation with Iran is more
complicated. However, there is some room for hope that, should more
effective sanctions be imposed by the Security Council, the Iranian
Supreme Leader will see the light. In any event, a line in the sand has
been drawn, and it must not be allowed to be crossed. Everybody under-
stands that, in this field, there is a chain reaction not only in the make-
up of the device but also in its consequences. If Iran is permitted to go
nuclear, the regional political fall-out could be disastrous.
8 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, [1968] United Nations Juridical
Yearbook 156.
9 The NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995: [1995] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 291, 301.
10 NPT, supra note 8, at 158.
2. Biological weapons
a) Mention will be made later of the 1925 Geneva Gas Warfare
Protocol. What is often forgotten is that the Protocol states that it
extends the prohibition of gas warfare to the use of bacteriological
methods of warfare as between Contracting Parties.11 Over the years,
it has been felt necessary to address the issue of biological weapons
head-on, delinked from gas warfare. This was accomplished when the
UN General Assembly drew up in 1971 a Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature in 1972.12 In this instrument, the
Parties undertake “never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” microbial and other biological
agents or toxins (whatever their origin or method of production),
designed to be used for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and to
destroy them (or divert to peaceful purposes) and “not to transfer exist-
ing biological weapons”.13
b) The formula first agreed upon in 1971 (“never in any circumstances
to develop” etc.) served as a model for the subsequent CWC. However,
there is one major difference. As we shall see, in the CWC, the capstone
of the prohibition is use (which is the most important issue from the
standpoint of jus in bello). The original formula of 1971 did not refer
expressis verbis to use, it being understood that use of biological weapons
had already been proscribed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.14 But, sure-
ly, when States undertake not to produce, acquire or retain a certain
weapon under any circumstances – in short, not to possess it – this effec-
tively precludes any possible use as well.15 After all, “what is not pos-
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11 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A
Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents 105, 107 (D. Schindler and J.
Toman eds., 4th ed., 2004).
12 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1971, The Laws of
Armed Conflicts, ibid., 135.
13 Ibid., 136-137.
14 See J. Goldblat, “The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview”, 37 International
Review of the Red Cross 251, 257 (1997).
15 See E.P.J. Myjer, “Means and Methods of Warfare and the Coincidence of Norms between
the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and the Law of Arms Control”, International Law
and the Hague’s 750th Anniversary 371, 374 (W.P. Heere ed., 1999).
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sessed cannot be used”.16 In any event, it is incontestable that custom-
ary international law prohibits today the use of biological weapons in
armed conflict.17
c) The problem with the 1971 Convention is that, unlike the CWC, it
does not incorporate a system of verification and inspection. It is some-
times asserted that this is due to lack of sufficient interest in the subject
of biological weapons. But such an assertion is based on a misconcep-
tion. The genuine obstacle impeding progress is that traditional modal-
ities of verification are not workable for biological weapons.18 This is a
case in which diplomats and lawyers have no choice but to await the
prospects of advances in science and technology. No doubt, as soon as a
scientific solution is found, verification measures will be grafted onto
the 1971 Convention through an additional Protocol.
d) The absence of obligatory verification from the 1971 Convention and
its presence in the CWC creates a possible loophole in the CWC
regime, inasmuch as it is not always easy to draw a clear-cut distinction
in a chemical reaction between what is produced exclusively by chem-
ical catalysts and what is effected with the help of bacteriological micro-
organisms. Needless to say, as long as a viable verification system exists
with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons (there is no duty
of subjecting to inspection the destruction of biological weapons) there
is every incentive to maintain a robust definition of chemical weapons.
3. Chemical Weapons
a) As early as 1899, Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating
Gases prohibited the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the dif-
fusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.19 Notoriously, poisonous gases
were employed on a massive scale in the battlefields of World War I.
16 A.V. Lowe, “1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction”, The
Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries 623, 643
(N. Ronzitti ed., 1988).
17Customary International Humanitarian Law 256 (International Committee of the Red
Cross, J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
18 See US Position on Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, [2002] Digest of
United States Practice in International Law 1037, id.
19 Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 1899, The Laws of Armed
Conflicts, supra note 11, at 95, 96.
However,Article 171 of the 1919 Versailles Treaty of Peace with Germany
referred to “[t]he use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all anal-
ogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited” as the ground for for-
bidding their manufacture in and importation to Germany.20
b) The watershed instrument on gas warfare is the aforementioned 1925
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
The Geneva Protocol starts by stating that “the use in war of asphyxiat-
ing, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquid materials or
devices” has already been prohibited in treaties to which the majority of
States are Parties; adding that those Contracting Parties to the Protocol
not having done so now accept the prohibition as binding between
themselves, with a view to making it universally accepted as a part of
international law.21
c) The reference to the acceptance of the Geneva Protocol’s prohibition
in relations between the Parties (inter se) might suggest that – at the
time the text was adopted – the injunction did not reach the goal of
general acceptance as part of customary international law. Not surpris-
ingly, perhaps, it took the United States half a century to ratify the
Geneva Protocol (in 1975). Still, even prior to the US ratification, the
prevalent view was that the Protocol had come to reflect customary
international law.22 That is not to say that the use of gas warfare has dis-
appeared in practice. In fact, mustard gas and nerve gas were resorted to
by Iraq in the course of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.23 But this was a
flagrant breach of the jus in bello. There is no doubt at all nowadays that
the prohibition of gas warfare has fully consolidated as customary inter-
national law.24 Indeed, “[e]mploying asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime pur-
suant to Article 8(b)(2)(xviii) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.25
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20 Versailles Treaty of Peace with Germany, 1919, 3 A History of the Peace Conference of Paris
99, 192 (H.W.V. Temperley ed., 1920)
21 Geneva Protocol, supra note 11, at 107.
22 See R.R. Baxter and T. Buergenthal, “Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925”, 64
American Journal of International Law 853, id. (1970).
23 See T.L.H. McCormack, “International Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf
War”, 21 California Western International Law Journal 1, 12-17 (1990-1991).
24 Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 17, at 259-260.
25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, The Laws of Armed Conflicts,
supra note 11, at 1309, 1318.
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e) The prohibition of chemical weapons in their totality was completed
only in 1993, in the CWC (the Paris Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction).26 In Article I of the CWC, States Parties are obligat-
ed “never under any circumstances” to use chemical weapons, to engage in
military preparations for such use, or to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile,
retain or transfer them; and they undertake to destroy chemical weapons
that they possess.27 The paramount legal engagement is not to use chemi-
cal weapons, all the other prohibitions being “secondary to the objective”.28
f) The term “chemical weapons” is defined in Article II of the CWC, and
the linchpin of the definition (in Paragraph 2) is that the chemical is
toxic in the sense that “its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or ani-
mals”.29 The reference to humans and animals leaves out anti-plant
agents (herbicides). This resulted from a “compromise package”,30 which
deleted herbicides from the definition in the operative clause yet insert-
ed in the Preamble the following statement: “Recognizing the prohibition,
embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of interna-
tional law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare”.31 It is note-
worthy that the United States (which insisted on the omission of the
prohibition of herbicides from the operative clause of the CWC) “has
formally renounced the first use of herbicides in time of armed conflict”,
except within US installations or around their defensive perimeters.32
g) Non-lethal chemicals (mainly tear gas) are included in the definition
of chemical weapons which refers to temporary incapacitation. In Article
I(5) of the CWC, States Parties undertake “not to use riot control agents
as a method of warfare”; whereas Article II(9)(d) explicitly allows the
employment of chemicals for “[l]aw enforcement including domestic riot
control purposes”.33 The net outcome is that recourse to tear gas and
26 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1993, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note
11, at 239, 241.
27 Ibid., 241-242.
28 W. Krutzsch and R. Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention 14 (1994).
29 CWC, supra note 26, at 242.
30See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note 28, at 8, 30.
31 CWC, supra note 26, at 241.
32 Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 73
International Law Studies 477 (US Naval War College,A.R Thomas & J.C. Duncan  eds., 1999).
33 CWC, supra note 26, at 242, 244.
other riot control chemicals is permissible in non-combat situations in
wartime, e.g., “in prisoner-of-war camps or military prisons”.34
h) Obligatory verification and on-site inspection of the destruction of
existing stockpiles of chemical weapons is the keystone of the CWC.
There are today some minor issues relating to the introduction of state-
of-the-art technology sensors not originally envisaged by the framers of
the CWC. But the major problem relates to the current deadlines for the
destruction of existing stockpiles (already extended for the two main
possessor States – the United States and Russia – until the last possible
moment allowed by the CWC, i.e., 2012). Given the pace of destruction
thus far, it is virtually certain that 2012 is not a realistic target date. In
the meantime, there is a concerted effort to maintain a “party line”,
whereby the pace of destruction should simply be quickened with a view
to meeting the mandatory deadlines. Tactically, this is probably the best
posture for one and all, particularly the OPCW (Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). But strategically it is time to start
considering unpalatable – yet probably inescapable – alternative modes
of action. A seminar of experts convened by the San Remo International
Institute of Humanitarian Law in 2006 recommended looking into the
options available.A formal amendment of the CWC is a complex process
under Article XV,35 and it is not an attractive way forward. One possible
option is to categorise the extension of the deadlines as “matters of
administrative or technical nature” (relating to changes in the Annexes)
in conformity with Paragraphs 4-5 of Article XV,36 in which case much
simpler avenues open up.
4. Conclusion
a) There is no doubt that, of the three legal regimes pertaining to
weapons of mass destruction, the most advanced (and the most success-
ful) is that established by the CWC. Although (with 182 contracting
Parties in 2007) the CWC is still short of universality, if a calibrated,
country-specific, approach is carefully applied to each of the 12 remain-
ing non-Contracting Parties, the CWC may well be on its way to achiev-
ing the goal of universality in a few years.
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35 CWC, supra note 26, at 268-269.
36 Ibid., id.
b) All the same, we must not rest on the CWC’s laurels: we must
acknowledge the flaws in the implementation of the CWC. The 2008
Review Conference needs to deal with a whole range of practical and
legal issues, not all of which have been addressed here.37
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37Suffice it to mention additional problems such as (i) the security of existing stockpiles of
chemical weapons from potential terrorist attacks; and (ii) the safety of chemical weapons
dumped on the seabed (bearing in mind the risks of corrosion of containers and the spread
of the chemicals).
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Since the 1950s, a number of treaties and multilateral regimes have
been established with the objective of preventing the use and the pro-
liferation, and promoting the elimination of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. In this paper, we shall concentrate on the universality of three
major treaties: the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was
signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction (BTWC) which was signed in 1972 and entered into force
in 19751, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the tenth
anniversary of the entry into force of which is being celebrated this
month (April 2007). In the course of our analysis, we shall also dis-
cuss the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on WMD terror-
ism and the export control regimes, and more particularly the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) with regard to the NPT and the Australian
Group (AG) with regard to the BTWC and CWC. It is obvious that
the Security Council resolution and these regimes are closely linked to
the implementation of the three major treaties. In this paper we are
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1 Closely linked with the BTWC is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The
Geneva Protocol signed in 1925 and which entered into force in 1928). The Protocol banned
the use but not the production, stockpiling or deployment of such weapons.
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not only concerned with the state of adherence to the treaties, but also
with their state of implementation which aims at making them real
universal instruments.
1. The NPT
The NPT is adhered to today by all nations of the world with the excep-
tion of India, Israel, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK). The latter withdrew from the NPT in 2003, although
there are signs that it may re-adhere to the Treaty given the latest devel-
opments concerning its readiness to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-
gramme and to bring its nuclear activities under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It is a matter which needs to be
watched carefully in the coming months.
As a result of these four States’ non-adherence to the NPT, its univer-
sality has been seriously affected. Their absence has also affected the
security of their respective regions, and has been a great source of insta-
bility. These States are not expected to give up their nuclear capabili-
ties, with the exception perhaps of the DPRK. Therefore, their future
adherence to the NPT is a far-fetched possibility.
In order to turn this dilemma around, two trends have emerged, sup-
ported by Israeli scholars and others. One suggests inviting Israel, India
and Pakistan to accede to an Additional Protocol to the NPT, obliging
them to behave “as if” they were parties to the treaty.2 Such a protocol
would permit the three States to retain their programmes, but inhibit
further development.3 The second trend advocates a new regime that
would replace the NPT and would include also the non-NPT States.The
latter would subject only fissile material produced for peaceful purpos-
es to international safeguards.4
Without going into the details of these proposals, it is clear that the
three States would be allowed to continue with their nuclear-weapon
capabilities unabated. They would merely undertake to abide by cer-
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tain provisions of the NPT that would not affect their nuclear-weapon
status, or they would become part of a new regime that would bring
them closer to or on par with the acknowledged five NPT nuclear-
weapon States. In other words, nuclear-weapon status would be con-
ferred upon them and endorsed by either the present or a new “non-
proliferation regime”. In the case of Israel, a country that has stated that
it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region,
this would mean that it would be faced with the possibility of implicit-
ly or explicitly accepting a status that it has so far hesitated to recognise.
It must be said, however, that recent statements by Israeli officials may
have given the impression that Israel is about to do away with the
uncertainty and the ambivalence of its nuclear programme.
Accommodating the three countries, whether within the NPT regime
or a “new regime” may encourage further proliferation from within
the NPT regime itself. Non-compliance and violations have already
beleaguered the regime. The suggested accommodation could exac-
erbate the worries. In such an atmosphere the disarmament process,
in compliance with Article VI of the NPT could be further weakened
or disregarded.
Moreover, a protocol attached to the NPT would be tantamount to
amending certain procedures and conditions prescribed by the Treaty,
and it seems to be rather difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill.
In the past, additional protocols to the NPT have been suggested with
regard to other issues but quickly discarded or withdrawn because of
the aforementioned considerations.
In the particular case of Israel, the way is quite open for it to adhere to
the NPT and abide by its provisions as a non-nuclear weapon State. A
unilateral declaration of behaviour as if it were a party to the NPT, an
alternate proposal as suggested by some, is meaningless if Israel’s status
remains ambivalent and its nuclear activities are not subjected to the
IAEA verification system. There is a clear route for impressing on non-
parties that they must abide by the NPT regime: simply adhering to the
Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States with all the implications of such a
status. Why invent other routes that would in fact legitimise the pres-
ent status quo and appear to Israel’s neighbours as sheer appeasement?
Israel’s nuclear programme is a source of great anxiety in the Middle
East. Security cannot prevail in the region in the shadow of Israel’s
growing nuclear weapon capabilities.
As for South Asia, the agreement reached by India and the United
States in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation has weakened, in our
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view, the NPT, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. The
argument that this agreement may bring India closer to the regime may
seem plausible at face value. But an in-depth analysis of this agreement
and its repercussions worldwide would indicate a double standard that
favours those outside the Treaty and those who have managed to reach
a nuclear weapon capability.5 Also, in sidestepping Pakistan, the agree-
ment may exacerbate further tensions in South Asia.
Closely linked with the universality of the NPT, is the establishment
around the world of nuclear weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). With regard to nuclear weapons, such
zones would further enhance the universality of the NPT. They have the
additional advantage of preventing the deployment of nuclear weapons
on the territories of the zones and providing negative nuclear guarantees
(non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons undertaking) for the bene-
fit of the parties in such zones. The idea of WMD-free zones were sug-
gested for the first time by Egypt in 1990, a proposal that coincided with
worrying reports and actions indicating that Iraq was attempting to
acquire equipment and materials relating to the construction of weapons
of mass destruction. President Mubarak of Egypt emphasized that all
weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be prohibited in
the Middle East, that all States of the region without exception should
make equal commitments in this regard and that verification matters and
modalities should be established to ascertain full compliance to the full
scope of the prohibitions by all States of the region without exception.6
Soon after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991,
ordering the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and
indicating that the dismantlement of these weapons could lead to the
beginning of the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East,
then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Amre Moussa forwarded a let-
ter to the UN Security Council in which he pointed out that recent
events in the Middle East induced many States to endorse Egypt’s lat-
est initiative, which was supported by the Security Council in the con-
text of its Resolution 687 (1991). The Minister spoke of according pri-
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ority to ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction. In order to
accelerate the establishment of the Middle East as a WMD-free zone,
Mr Moussa put forward a number of proposals:
a) “Egypt calls on the major arms-producing States – and particularly
the permanent members of the Security Council – as well as Israel, Iran
and the Arab States to deposit undertakings with the Security Council
in which they clearly and unconditionally endorse the declarations of
the Middle East as a region free of weapons of mass destruction and
commit themselves not to take any steps or measures which would run
counter to or impede the attainment of that objective.
b) Egypt calls on the arms-producing States and the parties to the Treaty
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to step up their efforts to
ensure that all Middle East nations which have not yet done so adhere
to the Treaty, in recognition of the fact that this is a step of the utmost
importance and urgency.
c) Egypt calls on the nations of the Middle East region which have not
yet done so to declare their commitment:
1. Not to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons,
2. Not to produce or acquire any nuclear weapons,
3. Not to produce or acquire any nuclear materials susceptible to
military use and to dispose of any existing stock of such materials,
4. To accept the IAEA safeguards regime whereby all their nuclear
facilities become subject to international inspection.
d) Egypt calls on those nations of the region which have not yet done
so to declare their commitment to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Convention concerning the
prohibition of biological weapons of 1972, no later than the conclusion
of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons being con-
ducted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
e) Egypt calls on Middle East States to declare their commitment
actively and fairly to address measures relating to all forms of delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
f) Egypt calls on nations of the region to approve the assignment to an
organ of the United Nations or another international organization of a
role, to be agreed upon at a future date, in the verification of these
nations’ compliance with such agreements on arms reduction and disar-
mament as may be concluded between them.”7
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The 1990 Egyptian initiative went beyond the 1974 initiative on estab-
lishing a zone free of nuclear weapons. In fact, it was the first time that
all weapons of mass destruction were linked to each other in one bas-
ket. Without exaggeration, this paved the way much later for further
linkage through the adoption of Resolution 1540 (2004) on WMD ter-
rorism and the valuable study undertaken by a commission established
(2006) by the Swedish Government on WMDs, which were dubbed
“weapons of terror”.8
Closely linked with the NPT is the CTBT, which is also open to all
States. Its entry into force has been delayed as a result of the lack of the
required ratifications, including that of the United States. The Treaty
will not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by the 44
States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. This list comprises the States
which formally participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on
Disarmament and which appear in Table 1 of the December 1995 edi-
tion of “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World” and Table 1 of the
April 1996 edition of “Nuclear Power Reactors in the World”, both com-
piled by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
However, the significant aspect of the CTBT is that an implementing
organization is already in place in Vienna and the International
Monitoring System (IMS) is already operating in that this system
detected the nuclear weapon test that the DPRK carried out on 9
October 2006. These are unique features of a treaty that has not yet
entered into force and are a good omen for the future of this Treaty.
The success of the early implementation of the CTBT should be an
incentive for nuclear weapon States to implement Article VI of the NPT
more fully, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. The problem
of universality involves not only non-adherence to WMD treaties but
also lack of full implementation of the provisions of the treaties. Let me
now move on to the CWC.
2. The CWC
There are now 182 parties to the CWC as compared to 178 in April 2006.
Unlike the NPT, all provisions of the CWC are non-discriminatory. Also,
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the CWC establishes well-defined mechanisms that do not exist for the
NPT. A number of States have not yet adhered to the Treaty. Among those
that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty are the Bahamas, Congo,
Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Israel and Myanmar. The non-signa-
tory States are Angola, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, DPRK, Somalia and Syria. At
the time of writing, Angola, Congo, Iraq and Lebanon were expected to
join soon. The reluctance to sign of at least one of the non-signatory coun-
tries, that is Egypt, is very much linked to the non-adherence of Israel to
the NPT and other treaties of weapons of mass destruction.
Egypt is not passive on this issue because it has been and still is very much
involved in aiming at establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in the region. The idea of the zone received a new boost in the latest
Arab Summit in Riyadh in March 2007 when the leaders of the Arab
States agreed with President Mubarak that a mechanism should be creat-
ed to activate the Egyptian initiative instead of just reiterating former posi-
tions, attitudes and resolutions. In this respect, the implementation of the
resolution on the Middle East of the NPT Review and Extension
Conference of 1995 supporting the establishment of a zone free of
weapons of mass destruction was highlighted.9 Without this resolution
there would have been no consensus at the 1995 NPT Review Conference
on the extension of the Treaty. The three Depository Governments of the
NPT co-sponsored that resolution and therefore it confers on them greater
responsibilities for bringing this resolution into fruition.
This reference to the NPT is simply to make the point that we need
to move on with the elimination of all WMDs. The Chemical
Weapons Convention has certainly made great progress through its
organization (OPCW) to convince more countries to adhere to the
Convention. This is an achievement in itself, and an acknowledge-
ment of the present efforts of its Director-General.10 The Treaty, like
its sister-treaty, the NPT, is also experiencing some problems and
challenges such as delays in observing the timetable for the destruc-
tion of declared CW stockpiles. The United States and Russia will be
granted a five-year extension of the destruction deadline, which
means April 2007-2012, yet even this extended deadline may not be
105
9 See Final Document Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference (New York, 1995),
(NPT/Conf. 1995/32, Part I).
10 For the role played by the OPCW, see Sergey Batsanov, Approaching The Tenth
Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention. A Plan for Future Progress,
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 2006, pp. 341-342.
Mohamed I. Shaker
met.11 Sergey Batsanov, a leading expert in this field, rightly observes
that the OPCW should seriously explore the possibility of closer
interaction with other international organizations and arrangements
to prevent WMD proliferation. For example, joint actions could be
considered with the IAEA on the issue of creating a WMD-free zone
in the Middle East.12 This view demonstrates the close interrelation-
ship between the treaties on weapons of mass destruction.
3. The BTWC
The state of adherence to the Treaty is less impressive than that of the
CWC, which is probably due to the fact that the Treaty does not have
an executive organ similar to that of the OPCW and lacks an effective
verification system. As of  April 2006, it had 155 Parties to it. Sixteen
States have signed the Convention but have not ratified it, while more
than 20 States have not signed it at all. In the first category, the States
are: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote-d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon,
Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania. Non-signatory States are:
Andorra, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cook Island, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia.
Like the NPT and the CWC, the BTWC is experiencing some difficul-
ties. As just pointed out, the Treaty lacks a capacity for monitoring and
verification, implementation and enforcement. An additional problem
is that many governments have not adopted or fully implemented
national legislations to ensure fulfillment of their obligations.
The last Review Conference of the Convention, held in December
2006, called for universal adherence to the Convention. It was a more
or less successful conference, although the question of verification was
perhaps its most obvious failure. Attempts in the past to study the ver-
ification problem had been brought to a standstill by the United States’
lack of interest, which remained unchanged at the conference.13
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Success in solving the verification issue might help with regard to fur-
ther adherence to the Treaty.
Closely related to the universality issue are the export control regimes
and, more particularly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)14 with
regard to the NPT and the Australia Group (AG)15 with regard to both
the CWC and the BTWC. What is needed are reliable assurances to all
parties of supply of the materials and substances needed for their legit-
imate activities. Guidelines and policies should be adopted by the sup-
pliers after close consultation with the potential recipient countries,
which are now usually confronted with guidelines and policies worked
out in their absence.
Lastly, Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 prescribed
for the first time under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the way to con-
tain, respond and act to face potential WMD terrorism. In order to
assess adherence to the domestic legal requirements of the resolution, a
committee of the Security Council has been created to review national
reports submitted by States on their  efforts to implement the resolu-
tion. After submitting its first report in 2006, the Committee’s mandate
was renewed for two years by Security Council Resolution 1673 of
27April 2006. It is too soon to assess the Committee’s work in this first
phase, however the aforementioned report was encouraging.
Finally, SC Resolution 1540 contains provisions that indicate that the
intention is to complement and reinforce, rather than replace and sub-
vert, the negotiated Treaties. It also indicates that the obligations of
the resolution should not be interpreted as conflicting or altering the
rights and obligations under the treaty regimes. The resolution calls
for the promotion of these Treaties, the adoption of their national
implementation requirements and cooperation with the non-prolifer-
ation treaty organizations.16
In conclusion, the universality of WMD treaties and related instruments
and regimes is a crucial element that ought to lead to equal treatment,
fairness and an open opportunity to join and contribute to a world free
of WMDs. Treaty-making has been, and should remain, the basic
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approach to universality. Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and
its sister resolution 1673 (2006) on WMD terrorism may one day find
their way into a single convention on combating terrorism in all its
facets. It would not be an easy task, but a precedent exists in the single
convention on drugs, another plague haunting us all.
In that context, an effective mechanism to achieve a WMD-free zone in
the Middle East that would include all States of the region, some of
which have not yet signed or ratified the relevant universal instruments,
could follow one of the following paths:
First, in the Arab League context, an action plan is needed to follow up
on the Riyadh Summit Declaration and Resolutions on an WMD-free
zone and peaceful nuclear cooperation.17 In this context, it is impor-
tant to activate a statement issued in Tunisia at the Arab Annual Summit
in May 2004 calling for the convening of an international conference
under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a
WMD-free zone in the Middle East. An important term of reference of
such a conference would be the Middle East Resolution adopted at the
Extension and Review Conference of the NPT in 1995 and sponsored
by the Depository Governments, the UK, Russia and the US. Also, the
work so far achieved by a special committee of the Arab League tasked
with negotiating a draft treaty on the establishment of a WMD-free
zone should be tabled. The Committee, after many years of diligent
work, was suspended by the Arab League, a clear indication of Arab
League members’ frustration and displeasure with the lack of support
and action on the part of the Depository Governments of the NPT.
The international conference, under UN auspices, could well be pre-
pared through the UN General Assembly by establishing a preparatory
committee that would hold three or four sessions preliminary to a con-
ference also with three sessions, much like the Law of the Sea  and the
Law of Treaties Conferences.
The idea of an international conference would give a boost to the results
obtained so far by the Arab League by  bringing other States of the
region, such as Israel and Iran, into play in an international framework.
Secondly, and still in a UN context, resort could be made to the Security
Council to implement the 1995 NPT Middle East Resolution. This
could be an alternative route or a first step towards bringing the issue
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before a UN conference. Egypt’s ideas put forward to the Security
Council in 1991 could be re-examined.
Thirdly, if the peace process in the Middle East were to resume soon on
bilateral and multilateral levels, and especially if the working group on
Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) were reconstituted, this
would be an opportunity to table the implementation of the 1995 NPT
Resolution on the Middle East and the results achieved so far in the
Arab League context.
The two most important issues to be resolved and settled in any attempt
to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East are the geographic
delimitations of the zone and the verification mechanisms within the
zone, along with IAEA safeguards, OPCW verifications and any future
BTWC verifications.
Hopefully these ideas may contribute to achieving the universality of all
WMD treaties, a goal we are all striving for.
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The international Conference on “The Tenth Anniversary of the
Chemical Weapons Convention: Assessment And Perspectives”, under
the High Patronage of the President of the Italian Republic, was organ-
ised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Istituto Affari
Internazionali. It took place on 19 April 2007 at Palazzo Rospigliosi in
Rome and was attended by representatives of the national institutions,
academic world, industry associations and civil society with the partici-
pation of Amb. Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The conference was convened on
the eve of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). It provided an opportunity to celebrate
its important accomplishments and to reflect on future challenges, also
with regard to the threat posed by terrorist networks.
The Conference was divided into three sessions, which focused on the
following issues: the assessment of the Convention; disarmament and
destruction challenges; disarmament and future prospects. The organis-
ers prepared a list of questions for each session, with the aim of foster-
ing an exchange of views among participants.
Several speakers emphasised that 2006 marked the beginning of a series
of anniversaries of various treaties dealing with non-proliferation and
disarmament: in addition to the CWC, in September 2006 there was the
tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty; 2007 marks the 40th anniversary of the entry into force
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 35th anniversary of both the first
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United States-Soviet Union agreement on the limitation of their strate-
gic arsenals (SALT 1) and the ABM Treaty; in 2008, the 40th anniver-
sary of the conclusion of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
will be celebrated.
Though all these agreements have played an important role in enhanc-
ing peace and security, results are mixed. The participants shared the
belief that the CWC regime is the most advanced with respect to other
disarmament regimes.
1. Achievements
The CWC was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into
force on 29 April 1997. It is the first multilateral treaty that requires the
total elimination of a type of weapon of mass destruction: all chemical
weapons and chemical weapons production facilities are to be destroyed
within an agreed timeframe.
The CWC contains not only disarmaments obligations, but is also aimed
at preventing the proliferation of new weapons. In other words, each
State Party is required not only to destroy all chemical weapons and
chemical weapons productions facilities, but also to ensure that toxic
chemicals and their precursors are only used for purposes not prohibit-
ed by the treaty.
In this respect, one of the essential features of the treaty is its advanced
and elaborate verification and compliance system. The verification is
based on routine on-site inspections of declared sites on the one hand
and ad hoc challenge inspections on the other. The latter constitutes the
most intrusive means introduced in the context of law on disarmament
and non-proliferation: each State Party has the right to request on-site
inspections in another State Party for the purpose of clarifying doubts
concerning possible non-compliance.
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
has been mandated to oversee the implementation of the Convention.
At the domestic level, States are required to enact penal legislation
encompassing all the activities prohibited by the Convention, to intro-
duce export controls and appropriate industry regulations. 119 States
Parties have adopted national legislation to implement the Convention.
95 % of them have also designated or established a national authority to
serve as the national focal point for the relations with the OPCW and
the other State Parties.
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On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of
CWC, there is more than one reason to celebrate the success of the
CWC regime. Some of the achievements are impressive. The number of
State Parties is 182, already representing about 98% of the global pop-
ulation and landmass, as well as 98% of the worldwide chemical indus-
try, while the number of signatories is 188. Six countries – India, Russia,
Republic of Korea, United States, Albania and Libya – have declared
possession of CW stockpiles. 100% of the declared CW production
facilities have been inactivated. 100% of the declared WP stockpiles has
been inventoried and verified. 61 of the 65 chemical weapons produc-
tion facilities declared to the Organisation by 12 States Parties have
either been destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes. Over 30% of
the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the
Convention have also been verifiably destroyed. Over 30% of the
world’s declared stockpiles of approximately 71,000 metric tonnes of
chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. Nearly 2,900 inspections
have taken place at 200 chemical weapon-related and over 850 indus-
trial sites on the territory of 79 States Parties since April 1997.
Worldwide, well over 5,000 industrial facilities are liable to inspection.
Manifold reasons explaining the success of the CWC regime were iden-
tified by the presentations.
The first, which differentiates the CWC from other disarmament and
non-proliferation treaties, is its “non-discriminatory” character. All States
parties are treated equally, regardless of whether or not they possess
CW. The situation is clearly different from the one established by the
NPT, which distinguishes “nuclear weapon States” from “non-nuclear
weapon States”. A further crucial element of differentiation from the
NPT is the CWC’s integrity, as it does not admit reservations.
Secondly, it was argued that the success should also be attributed to the
diminished interest in CW on the part of the two superpowers in the
final years of the Cold War, due to the relatively limited weight of the
existing CW arsenals in the military balance of power.
A third factor recognised during the Conference is the important role
played by various actors: the OPCW in primis, but also some States and
NGOs. The OPCW, unlike other monitoring bodies, is responsible for
all aspects of treaty implementation. This makes the CWC a ‘living
instrument’ with the capacity to deal with inevitable unforeseeable
implementation problems. It was also noted that the Organisation has
constantly been committed to helping non-Party  States to join the
CWC. The recent accessions of Libya, Sudan, Serbia and Montenegro
Mirko Sossai
demonstrate the importance of dialogue and the potential of multilat-
eralism. The OPCW Director-General stressed that meetings with dele-
gations of non-parties have provided a unique opportunity to impress
upon the interlocutors the importance that the international communi-
ty attaches to the universality of the CWC and also to underscore the
fact that the norms against chemical weapons can now be regarded as
truly global.
A further aspect of the synergy between the CWC and the OPCW is
that the latter has promoted a culture of cooperation and consultation
among the delegations of the member States. A significant number of
States are involved in the decision-making with regard to a specific
issue, as the Convention gives significant powers to both the Executive
Council and the Conference of States Parties. One of the speakers how-
ever pointed to the high politicisation of every CWC issue, including
some seemingly purely administrative and technical points: it goes with-
out saying that CWC issues are generally informed by the cost, scope
and level of intrusiveness that the States Parties believe are necessary. It
was argued that issues are sometimes politicised for the wrong reasons
and that the progress in the implementation of the regime has therefore
been slowed down.
During the Conference, several participants stressed the role played by
Italy in the development of the CWC regime. Already in the final phase
of the negotiations in 1993, Italy’s contribution was crucial within the
Western group. Amb. Pfirter expressed deep appreciation for Italy’s
strong support for the objectives of the Convention and the concrete
assistance it provides to the OPCW in its work: the Director-General
stressed its exemplary commitment, for example in the field of the
elimination of remnants on the one hand and in the capacity building
on the other. In this regard, the activities of the Italian NBC Joint
Logistic Technical Centre, based in Civitavecchia, deserve attention. Its
institutional tasks include the identification, recovering, storage and
destruction of old and abandoned CW discovered on national territory.
In addition, the two training areas at the Centre’s headquarters offer a
valuable contribution to the assistance and capacity building pro-
grammes. Representatives of the Government and Parliament con-
firmed Italy’s full support for the CWC and its intention to continue to
play an active role.
To conclude on the contribution of key-actors to chemical disarma-
ment, one should not forget the role of NGOs and in particular the
Green Cross, which also contributed to the organisation of the
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Conference. Representatives of this organisation presented the “Legacy
Program”, which is an international effort by national affiliates of Green
Cross international in the United States, Belarus, Canada, Germany,
Italy, Russia, Switzerland and the Ukraine. In the framework of this ini-
tiative, they have set up and manage 12 public outreach offices at CW
stockpiles and other sensitive sites.
2. Problems and Challenges
Despite the progress in the implementation of CWC, various challenges
for the future of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation were
identified. At the Conference the discussion was thought-provoking and
several recommendations were formulated: all participants agreed that
the Second Review Conference, which will take place in April 2008,
represents an important opportunity for States Parties and OPCW to
deal with the main challenges.
2.1 Universality
Thirteen countries are still not members of the OPCW.The Korea penin-
sula and the Middle East are the two geographic areas that pose the
greatest challenge to achievement of universal adherence to the CWC.
The OPCW has recently made efforts to generate positive momentum
towards accession to the Convention in Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Lebanon.
Iraq and Lebanon have already decided to join but there are delays due
to domestic procedures. The position of Egypt is different. It was
observed that it is still difficult – if not impossible – for this country to
accede to the CWC as long as Israel does not adhere to the NPT (Egypt
ratified this instrument in 1981). In the opinion of one speaker, this
demonstrates the close interrelationship between the treaties on
weapons of mass destruction. One of the most challenging questions is
therefore how to build confidence and increase transparency in the
region. It is noteworthy that since 1990, Egypt has supported the initia-
tive of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. But this
proposal has been received with mixed reactions. As for Israel, it was
hypothesized that Israel could join the CWC in the near future, given
that chemical weapons are no longer a crucial issue since Iraq has ceased
to be a threat after the collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The position of the countries that have only signed the Convention
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(Bahamas, Congo, Dominican Republic, Guinea Bissau, Israel and
Myanmar) remains to be seen. Under article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatory States are “obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”.
In addition, it was observed that the CWC does not abrogate the 1925
Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poison-
ous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, the con-
tinued validity of which is expressly emphasized in article XVI of the
CWC. The Protocol is therefore still in force and also prohibits the use
of CW in warfare. Unfortunately, unlike the CWC, reservations to the
Protocol are admitted and several States had employed this tool to
retain the right to use CW if those weapons were used first against them
or their allies. It is desirable that these reservations be soon withdrawn:
a number of State Parties (among them Australia, Russia and Spain) has
already done so.
A further issue examined in one of the presentations was the effects of
war on the CWC. It is not clear whether this situation provokes a sus-
pension of the operation of the Convention. In this regard, it was
observed that the CWC in any case contains a generous withdrawal
clause. Each State Party can exercise this right “if it decides that extraor-
dinary events, related to the subject-matter of the Convention, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”
This introduces the question of the contribution of the CWC to the
development of customary international law. This is a crucial issue, since
customary law is binding for all States. According to the recent study
carried out under the auspices of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the prohibition of the use of CW is a norm of customary
international law applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflicts. It is also noteworthy that Article 8 (2) (b) (xviii) of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court considers “employing
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, mate-
rials or devices” as a war crime, in respect of which the Court has juris-
diction. As for criminal prosecution at the domestic level, it is signifi-
cant that on 9 May 2007 the Court of Appeal in The Hague
(Netherlands) sentenced a Dutch national, F. van Anraat, to 17 years
imprisonment for complicity in war crimes committed by Saddam
Hussein and others. In 1987 and 1988, during the armed conflict with
Iran, the Iraqi regime used chemical weapons – such as mustard gas – on
a large scale in Northern Iraq and Iran, causing the death or permanent
injury of many thousands of Kurds and Iranians. The Court found that
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Van Anraat, prior to those attacks, had supplied Iraq for years with large
quantities of Thiodiglycol (TDG), knowing full well that the substance
could and would be used for the production of mustard gas.
To conclude on the issue of universality, a comparison with the less sat-
isfactory discipline of nuclear weapons is particularly significant. The
1968 NPT is one of the multilateral treaties that enjoys the greatest
number of ratifications, but it lacks the necessary universality because of
the factual importance of the absentees  As to whether or not it forms
customary international law, the International Court of Justice, in the
1996 advisory opinion, could not conclude definitively “whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence”.
After having pointed out the confusion in the reasoning of the Court
between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, one of the speakers held
that the use of nuclear weapons is clearly subject to the general princi-
ples of international humanitarian law: it follows, for example, that
indiscriminate use or use of nuclear weapons against civilians is prohib-
ited. Moreover, since the prohibition of means and methods of warfare
which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is not contest-
ed, one could still consider the possibility of the use of ‘clean’ nuclear
weapons in very specific scenarios, such as in the middle of the ocean.
2.2 Complete disarmament within 2012
It is now clear, ten years after entry into force of the CWC, that the
deadline for the complete destruction of the stockpiles established in
Article IV, was inadequate. According to the sources provided by vari-
ous speakers at the Conference, as of the end of April 2007, the United
States has destroyed 40 % of its stockpile, India 53  percent, and A State
Party (according to OPCW jargon) 67 percent. The estimation for
Albania is 20  percent, while Libya, which only joined the Convention
in 2004, has not yet begun. The situation in Russia appeared to be very
difficult from the very beginning: it took 9 years to destroy the first 10
% of its arsenal. During the last year, Russia has made significant
progress towards the destruction of 20 % of its 40,000 metric tons
stockpile, but this last figure seems to be controversial.
On 8 December 2006, the 11th Conference of the State Parties granted
extensions to five of the six possessor States (United States, Russia,
India, Libya, A State Party). The Conference extended the deadline for
A State Party until December 2008, for India until April 2009 and for
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Libya until December 2010. The United States and Russia obtained the
maximum extension possible under Part IV of the CWC Verification
Annex: until 29 April 2012. In Albania, completion of the destruction
process was expected in May/June 2007.
It was observed that the United States and Russia could fail to meet the
2012 deadline: according to one of the most pessimistic estimates, destruc-
tion in the United States will not be completed before the end of 2023.
Several reasons for delays were suggested: financial constraints, political
resistance and technical challenges.
For Russia, insufficient financing has represented the main problem:
destruction is indeed a very expensive business. At the Conference, one
of the presentations focused on the cost issues: Article IV (16) and
Article V (19) provide that the costs for the destruction and verification
are met by the CW possessor States. It is significant that soon after the
CWC entered into force, both Russia and the United States attempted
to limit their expenditures for reimbursing verification costs. The
debate on the reimbursable part of an inspector’s salary took up much
of the first meetings of the Conference of the State Parties: a compro-
mise was only reached at the third session.
Both additional national financing and international assistance have con-
tributed to improving the Russian destruction programme. The Global
Partnership is the most important financial support initiative. It was
launched at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada (June 2002). G8
countries announced that they would pledge $20 billion over the next ten
years to fund projects, above all in Russia, to achieve the goal of non-pro-
liferation of weapons or materials of mass destruction. The priority areas
identified by Russia are: the improvement of the physical security of facil-
ities and WMD materials, the prevention of radiological contamination
and, finally, the destruction of chemical weapons agents. On 5 November
2003, Italy and Russia signed a bilateral agreement for assistance in the
construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Pochep. Italy
pledged 365 million for 2004-08 but implementation has yet to start.
As for the United States, several speakers observed that the initial suc-
cess of the destruction program created a sense of complacency in polit-
ical circles characterised by increasing indifference towards disarma-
ment. Other presentations pointed to technical problems, such as unan-
ticipated heavy-metal contamination and fires at destruction sites.
To address the challenges of destruction, the Conference of States Parties,
at its 11th session in December 2006, decided that representatives of the
Executive Council should conduct additional visits to CW destruction
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facilities in the United States and Russia. The visits are intended as an
“additional transparency and confidence-building measure”.
The question arises as to what will happen if one of the CW possessor
States should fail to meet the deadline. Some speakers opposed a formal
amendment of the Convention, since they held that this approach could
favour attempts to renegotiate other important provisions.
A more elegant solution would be to apply the existing provisions of the
CWC. As for the reactions to non-compliance, Article XII contemplates
“measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance”. In this frame-
work, it was suggested that the Conference of States Parties could have
a certain margin of discretion in deciding the types of measures.
It is important to recall that, in cases of serious damage to the object and
the purpose of the Convention, the Conference of States Parties can
recommend collective measures in conformity with international law.
Furthermore, in cases of particular gravity, the issue may be submitted
to the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. In the case of a
CW possessor State missing the deadlines, one cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of the Security Council determining the existence of a threat to
peace and adopting measures not involving the use of force under
Article 41 of the UN Charter. However, it was argued that such extreme
measures are hardly practicable: for the present, it is difficult to imag-
ine a State intending to hide and keep parts of its chemical arsenal.
2.3 Non-proliferation
The verification regime serves two different functions: confidence
building and prevention of cheating. Against this background, it was
argued that the CWC system works well and that the evaluation
remains positive, also with regard to the inspection activities designed to
prevent diversion of chemical substances form peaceful to military pur-
poses. However several challenges were identified.
A first aspect is the reluctance of the States Parties to use the most rad-
ical verification tool: the right to request challenge inspections. A per-
sistent element of concern is that some States Parties may not have
declared all their CW facilities. In 2005, the US State Department
reported possible clandestine CW programs in Russia, China, Iran and
Sudan. To address these concerns, the United States made recourse to
bilateral channels. Nevertheless, in a hypothetical scenario of grave non-
compliance, the challenge inspection mechanism would constitute the
only effective way to detect non-compliance.
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Other participants at the Conference pointed out the imbalances in the
design of the CWC regime: they stressed the heavy emphasis on the ver-
ification of CW destruction (85% of all inspector-days) at the expense
of certain types of industry inspections.
The issue of industry verification needs to be considered in the frame-
work of the potential risk of scientific and technological developments.
Article XI affirms the rights of States Parties to economic and techno-
logical development, and access to technology for purposes not prohib-
ited under the CWC. However, one should not forget the ‘dual use’
nature of scientific research and the potential for misuse of the techno-
logical developments. While the system of routine on-site inspections at
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 facilities has been adequate, ‘other chemical
production facilities’ (OCPFs) have remained almost untouched by the
verification regime. OCPFs are defined as plant sites producing
unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (cf. Part IX of the CWC
Verification Annex). In recent years, the number of these chemical pro-
duction facilities has significantly increased. Modern technology makes
them multi-functional and flexible: in some commentators’ view, this
means they can easily be diverted to CW production. It was observed
that the current intensity of inspections at the OCPF (between 1 and
2,5% per year) does not offer a real deterrent. The OPCW Director-
General also agreed on the importance of strengthening the non-prolif-
eration aspects of the Convention through an enhanced regime con-
cerning industry verification, especially in the category of OCPF. In this
context, the representative of the Italian Federation of Chemical
Industries (Federchimica) affirmed the continuing firm commitment of
the private sector to the implementation of the CWC, in a constant
spirit of collaboration with the national authorities and the OPCW.
To conclude on the measure to prevent the proliferation of CW, it was sug-
gested that export control regimes should be strengthened. In particular,
the issue of applying export controls to Schedule 3 chemicals was raised.
2.4 Non-Lethal Chemical Agents
A further serious challenge posed by scientific and technological
developments is constituted by the production and use of non-lethal
chemical agents. Their employment as a method of warfare is clearly
prohibited. Although the CWC provides a specific “law-enforcement”
exemption (Article II.9.d), it is controversial whether non-lethal
agents may be used for counter-terrorism operations. It was suggested
120
Report of the Conference
that the Second Review Conference in April 2008 should address this
important challenge.
2.5 Terrorism
Terrorism is perceived as a major threat to peace and security at the begin-
ning of the XXI century. In February 2007, the Security Council devoted
a meeting to the issue of cooperation with international organisations in
the implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004), which is aimed at pre-
venting the access by terrorists to weapons of mass destructions.
On that occasion, the OPCW Director-General pointed out that the
CWC is not designed to address the threat of chemical terrorism direct-
ly. Nevertheless, by helping States Parties to meet all requirements
regarding nation implementation of CWC, the OPCW contributes to
ensuring that dangerous chemicals are not misused in any manner,
including for terrorism.
Assistance to States Parties remains fundamental also for the fight
against terrorism. It was observed that, in many cases, delays in the ful-
filment of CWC obligations are not a result of a lack of political will,
but are due to a lack of specific expertise. The Conference of States
Parties adopted a plan of action to assist Governments who have not yet
fully implemented the Convention.
3. CWC as a model for other WMD initiatives
The final issue relates to the impact of the CWC regime on the devel-
opment of other disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. Does
the CWC constitute a model? The perception at the Conference was
that the answer should be positive. It is true that the CWC and the
OPCW were products of the final phase of the Cold War and could not
have emerged in a different historical scenario and that the attempts to
use the CWC as a model have not been successful (the CTBT, for exam-
ple, is still far from entering into force). At the same time, there are a
number of lessons to be drawn from the 10-year experience of the
CWC, which may constitute a valuable reference for other WMD ini-
tiatives: the CWC has created a non-discriminatory disarmament and
non-proliferation regime, strictly controlled by a mix of cooperative and
more forceful verification techniques, with a special focus on building
capacity, transparency and confidence.
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